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Clare Bullock Boyd
“Ultra-High Risk”: Exploring
the Prodrome to Psychosis
through Cognitive and
Dialogic Theoretical Lenses
ABSTRACT
This study is a theoretical exploration of the clinical phenomenon known as the
prodrome to schizophrenia. The prodrome refers to a constellation of clinical symptoms
that signal considerably high risk for the development of psychosis and/or schizophrenia.
The prodrome is an area of high research interest, as the potential for early intervention
with prodromal individuals to prevent or delay the onset of psychosis appears to be
possible.
The clinical phenomena of the prodrome were explored, including a
comprehensive review of the relevant literature and research. Case material is also
presented. The prodrome is then conceptualized with a cognitive theoretical framework,
including a discussion of research interventions using a cognitive or cognitive-behavioral
approach and application to the case material with a cognitive theoretical perspective.
The core cognitive components of cognitive distortions, automatic thoughts and core
beliefs were examined and applied to the prodrome.
Next, the prodrome was explored using a postmodern approach, specifically
utilizing a dialogic theoretical framework. A discussion of the Open Dialogue approach
was applied to the prodrome and to the case material. The core postmodern and dialogical
concepts of dialogical process, loss of agency/voice and sense of self were applied to the
prodromal phenomena.

The two theoretical conceptualizations were then explored more in depth,
including a discussion of the commonalities and divergences between the theories. I then
used the core components of the two theories to formulate a synthesis in order to
illuminate the prodrome in a new way. My findings from this process were indicative
that, from both theoretical points of view, one of the defining features of the prodrome is
a person’s altered sense of self, which leads to a diminished self-experience. The
prevalence of negative symptoms, apparent cognitive decline, “soft” or attenuated
hallucinations and delusional beliefs and role or functional decline during the prodromal
phase are often the result of an externalizing bias and core vulnerabilities based on a
person’s experience of the self as diminished. The thesis concludes with clinical practice
implications and application to the case material.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia and other disorders that include psychosis as the defining feature of
the illness have long eluded comprehensive theoretical conceptualization. Many theories
toward an etiology of the heterogeneous symptomatology encompassing schizophrenia
have been proposed and researched. For many decades, there has existed a tension
between the biological model and models that emphasize the significance of
environmental and psychosocial stressors in the pathology of psychosis. While
researchers, clinicians and academics cannot agree on the causation of psychosis, they
certainly can agree on one thing: that psychotic disorders are ubiquitously debilitating
and cause enormous suffering for patients and their families, as well as society at large.
Research of late has focused predominantly on clinical trials for antipsychotic medication
and its role in symptom abatement and management. With this suffering as motivation
and a growing body of evidence in diagnostic accuracy and psychopharmacological
efficacy, further research has delved into attempting to understand the phase or period
preceding full-blown frank psychosis. This phase, period or constellation of symptoms
has come to be known as the prodrome to schizophrenia. The prodrome refers to a set of
risk factors that point to the potential onset of schizophrenia or psychotic disorders. This
study will explore the phenomena of the prodrome and then will use two different
theoretical frameworks to conceptualize this clinical entity.
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While research in the area of understanding and identifying the prodrome with
certainty has gained much interest over the last few decades, definitive knowledge of the
nature of the prodrome does not yet exist. Intervening clinically with patients meeting the
criteria for frank psychosis or schizophrenia has long been moving toward a bio-medical
and neuro-developmental conceptualization, but the etiology of the full blown illness
remains fundamentally elusive, further complicating attempts to understand the earliest
manifestations of the illness. The DSM-III-R (American Psychological Association
[APA], 1987) included nine symptoms of the putative prodrome; however, this category
was eliminated from the DSM-IV-R (APA, 1994). As categorization and diagnostic
certainty remain debatable among researchers, many clinicians see patients with subclinical manifestations of psychotic symptoms in a variety of settings. Schizophrenia is
generally understood to be a highly debilitating chronic course of illness that exacts an
enormous social cost on families, as well as long-term burdens on mental health delivery
systems (Lavretsky, 2008). Therefore, prevention and early intervention are areas of high
interest.
The predominant paradigm for conceptualizing schizophrenia has been the
biomedical framework, which is represented by biological psychiatry and more
specifically by the psychopharmological treatment of illnesses and clinical presentations
classified as psychiatric disorders. This paradigm has become so prevalent in explaining
the causes, conceptualizations and treatments for schizophrenia that psychosocial or
environmental influences are most often considered secondary. The stress-diathesis
model or stress-vulnerability model contends that a genetic, biological, or neurological
marker predisposes an individual to developing schizophrenia, with environmental,
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psychological, social, or developmental influences offering contributory impact to the
onset of first the first episode of psychosis (Ellman & Cannon, 2008), as well as to the
attenuated symptoms often observed in the prodromal state.
The primary preferred treatment for frank psychosis and for schizophrenia at this
time is antipsychotic medication (Torrey, 1995). One of the first treatments considered
successful in treating schizophrenia was chlorpromazine (Downar & Kapur, 2008). This
and other major tranquilizers were used broadly during the 1950s, particularly in
institutionalized patients with a schizophrenia diagnosis (Lavretsky, 2008). First
generation, or typical, antipsychotics, also known as neuroleptic drugs, are generally
believed to work on the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Second generation, or
atypical antipsychotics, work on negative symptoms, as well as positive symptoms
(Downar & Kapur, 2008). Both clinicians and laypeople alike seem to be in agreement
that schizophrenia is the result of a hereditary biochemical or neurological disorder that
results in disordered thinking, perceptual and sensory abnormalities, social withdrawal
and other depression-like symptoms (Torrey, 1995). Along with medication, psychosocial
treatment modalities have and continue to include social skills training, cognitive
behavioral therapy, clinical case management and supportive counseling (Downar &
Kapur, 2008; Torrey, 1995). Therefore, it can be stated that the overarching paradigm for
understanding psychotic illness, while dominated by a biomedical and
neurodevelopmental conceptualization, also includes a strong psychosocial understanding
of the clinical presentation of psychotic disorders. For example, it is commonly
understood that psychosocial stressors like homelessness or social isolation can lead to
the exacerbation of psychotic symptoms (Bebbington & Kuipers, 2008). Further, the
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content of positive symptoms like delusions and hallucinations often include aspects of
the individual’s social network, family history and current circumstance. Thus, the
dominant paradigm in which we find most understanding of psychosis, schizophrenia and
the prodrome to psychosis is located firmly within the biopsychosocial model.
Expanding the understanding of schizophrenia to include psychological and social
factors has led to less restrictive interventions, such as wraparound social supports in the
community, rather than institutionalization or long-term hospitalization. However, it
remains that intensive reliance on a biomedical understanding of the etiology of
psychosis has led to very high rates of psychiatric medication prescription (Seikkula,
2002). Further, psychosocial theories have been seen as secondary, primarily as
contributing to or triggering a pre-existent underlying genetic or other biological
proclivity to a specific illness. This model parallels the stress-vulnerability model of risk
for other medical illnesses, such as heart disease or diabetes, where environmental or
psychosocial factors (e.g. diet or stress) are seen as bringing out an already present
propensity for the full-blown disease. In such a model, the prodrome to schizophrenia can
be understood as a constellation of factors that signal high risk for developing psychosis
or schizophrenia. In the phenomenon chapter, I will provide a thorough concept of the
current understanding of the prodrome. In this thesis I aim to examine the clinical
phenomena that are known as the prodrome from both a modernist and postmodernist
perspective. I then aim to take these two theoretical perspectives and draw significant
elements of both to establish an understanding of what is happening during the prodrome.
The topic of this thesis is of significance to clinical social work as it explores the earliest
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manifestations of one of the most debilitating clinical presentations that social workers
interface with, namely non-affective psychotic illnesses.
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter serves to introduce the
purpose of the study, the phenomenon to be explored and the relevance to clinical social
work. The second chapter details the phenomenon of the prodrome, including a review of
current relevant literature and research outlining the prodrome. The phenomenon chapter
will include case material in order to orient the reader to the clinical presentation of the
prodrome. The case of James is provided as a way of grounding the phenomena in
practical and applicable ways. In the fourth chapter, I will discuss cognitive theory within
the context of a biopsychosocial framework, including a review of the literature. In the
first theory chapter, cognitive theory and cognitive-behavioral treatments will be
explored. Cognitive-behavioral interventions have been studied more than any other
psychological interventions in the treatment of first episode psychosis, full-blown
schizophrenia and the prodrome. Several studies have indicated the use of CBT with the
clinically high-risk population demonstrating attenuated psychotic symptoms. I will then
use cognitive theory to conceptualize the case material from the second chapter. In the
fifth chapter, I will discuss dialogic theory within the broader context of postmodern
theory, including relevant research and literature. Dialogic theory is represented in this
thesis by the Open Dialogue Approach, which is a clinical approach to psychiatric crisis
that has gained widespread use and success in Northern Finland. I will use dialogism and
the Open Dialogue approach to conceptualize the case material. In the final chapter, I will
discuss cognitive theory and dialogic theory to explore the prodrome to psychotic illness.
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Each theory explored has a clinical application, which I describe in relation to the case
material.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical framework for the subsequent
chapters. I will also be developing and describing the analytical framework that will be
used in the discussion chapter. As previously said, this paper will explore the concept of
the prodrome of schizophrenia. The definition of the prodrome is as elusive as the clinical
entity; researchers have, however, refined definitions that appear to be valid and reliable
in prospective studies. Nonetheless, the period leading up to full-blown psychotic illness
remains mysterious in many ways. Many theoretical lenses have been applied to the
processes, symptoms and experiences that are known as schizophrenia or psychosis. This
study will attempt to expand the current research literature base by extrapolating existent
theory to the prodrome. This thesis will utilize current theoretical understandings of
schizophrenia to investigate the applicability of such theories to the prodrome. The two
theories that will be used are cognitive theory and dialogic theory. Each theory will be
applied to the phenomena of the prodrome as well as to case material. Cognitive theory’s
application is understood in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, while dialogism’s is best
represented in the Open Dialogue Approach.
It is important to compare the fundamental principles of each theory in order to
understand what assumptions underlie the two theories. One way to access the
fundamental principles of a theory related to human experience is to investigate the
theory’s assumptions of human nature and how individuals’ experience their sense of
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self. This is to ask, “how does this theory conceptualize self-experience?” I will access
this question by outlining an individual’s self-experience from the two theoretical
perspectives and case material. Self-experience is frequently used to match theoretical
perspectives with subjective experience or practice (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). These
explorations are important to clinical social workers because they underlie our
foundational understanding of the self, which informs practice and interventions.
Deviation from healthy manifestations of the self is a presentation of psychopathology
that often accompanies those suffering from psychosis or the prodrome when seeking
help from clinicians. Self-experience, a person’s subjective experience of himself or
herself in the world, is of paramount importance in moving towards understanding the
phenomena in the prodrome. In the discussion chapter, I will examine the fundamental
conceptualization of self-experience in both cognitive theory and dialogism. This will
then assist in the examination of how humans’ self-experience is impacted during the
prodrome from each theoretical perspective.
Biopsychosocial Theory: Cognitive Theory and Cognitive-Behavioral Approach
The fundamental conception of self-experience in cognitive theory involves the
processing of information. In cognitive theory, alterations to adaptive information
processing are associated with general psychopathology. It is important to examine the
different ways that information processing becomes maladaptive during the prodrome
from a cognitive perspective. These maladaptive processes are exhibited in unhealthy or
pathological ways of thinking, feeling or behaving. These psychological symptoms can
be recognized, managed, corrected, or addressed, according to cognitive theory.
Maladaptive information processing is acknowledged and corrected during cognitive-
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behavioral therapy. Unhealthy ways of processing internal representations of external and
internal stimuli are addressed by a therapist with the client. The client then replaces
maladaptive beliefs and thoughts in order to manage the difficult patterns of feeling and
behaving associated with the beliefs. Combating maladaptive beliefs appears to be
beneficial in redressing the patterns of thought and subsequent distress associated with
schizophrenia (see Chapter 4 for review of this research). Cognitive theory, as applied in
cognitive-behavioral interventions, is rooted in a biopsychosocial model that includes the
possibility that psychotic illness is the result of a confluence of biological, social and
psychological factors. The cognitive approach focuses primarily on the psychological
components of the onset in the prodrome, but also explains how these processes impact
and are impacted by biological and social forces.
As will be discussed at length in this paper, the prodrome can be understood as
the earliest manifestation of psychosis or schizophrenia. From a cognitive theoretical
basis, the disorder of thought and information processing begins during the prodromal
phase. This leads to the maladaptive patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving that can
impact a person’s self-experience. A prodromal individual’s self-experience is
diminished as the capacity for adaptive and coherent information processing is thwarted.
Intervening early in this process may offset or possibly prevent conversion to psychosis,
within a cognitive theoretical frame.
After exploring the fundamental principles of self- experience in cognitive theory,
I will use the following cognitive theoretical components to structure the analysis: core
beliefs, automatic thoughts and cognitive distortions as they relate to the clinical
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presentation of the prodrome. The ways that the cognitive behavioral approaches address
these components during psychosocial interventions will also be discussed.
Postmodern Theory: Dialogism and the Open Dialogue Approach
In postmodern theory and specifically dialogism, the fundamental
conceptualization of human nature is the notion that each being occupies multiple selves
or self-positions that are in constant internal dialogue with each other. As Lysacker and
Lysacker, 2008, aptly describe, “we sense ourselves within and through encounters that
are at once intra- and interpersonal, and that reflect complementary and dissonant facets
of our being. [S]elf-positions are axes of self-world interaction, more a matter of who we
are, than of whom we take ourselves to be” (p. 34). A continuous and ordered series of
shifts in our multiple self-positions relative to relationships, situations and experiences
reveals itself to us through the process of intra- and interpersonal dialogue. While this
process is a complex and dynamic interplay, it remains ordered as a response to worldly
interactions and coherent internal experience. The most basic concept of what a human
being does is to be in constant dialogue with others and within the individual his or
herself.
Self- experience in dialogic theory is emphasized as a coherent self-awareness
that emerges out of a collection of voices or self-positions (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002).
Another foundational principle of humanity in dialogism is that human beings are
innately relational and therefore must always be in dialogue with others. According to
dialogism and other social constructivist post-modern theories, meaning is constructed as
a relational activity (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005). Any utterance that is spoken is in
response to another being and bears out its meaning as it is responded to. One of the
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major components of post-modern thinking regarding schizophrenia is the diminishment
of the dialogical process, both intra-personally and interpersonally. Subjective selfexperience in the prodrome is marked by incoherence and the collapse or diminishment
of the self’s experience as dialogical (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002).
This internal intrapersonal dialogue is interrupted and diminished in the prodrome
to schizophrenia, as well. During the prodromal phase, it is not unusual for the dialogical
nature of the self to be compromised in many ways. Firstly, the loss of agency and voice
plays a major role in a prodromal individual’s capacity to engage in the dialogical
process. The individual’s sense of self or subjectivity is also compromised during the
prodromal phase. This frequently leads to withdrawal from interests and social contacts
that usually have significance for the individual.
I will use the concepts of dialogical process, sense of self and loss of
agency/voice to guide my analysis of the post-modern and dialogic theoretical lens
applied to the prodrome. I will then explore the specific ways that the Open Dialogue
approach addresses these concepts.
Methodology
In the discussion, I will compare and contrast the two theoretical perspectives on
the prodrome, entering this discussion by each theory’s concept of healthy selfexperience. I will firstly explore the ways the two theories diverge and ways each
individual theory could be used to critique the other. I will then move into an in depth
exploration of the ways the two theories can be brought together to help us better
understand the phenomena of the prodrome. This will be accomplished by examining the
ways the components of core beliefs, automatic thoughts and cognitive distortions from
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cognitive theory and dialogical process, sense of self and loss of agency/voice from
dialogical theory correlate to each other and help to illuminate the prodrome in a new
way. The synthesized theoretical approach will then be applied to the case of James. I
will end with offering treatment and clinical practice implications and suggestions, based
on this new understanding that develops from the theoretical synthesis.

12

CHAPTER THREE
THE PHENOMENON
The following chapter will outline and detail the clinical entity that has come to
be known as the prodrome of schizophrenia. This particular area of research has gained
prominence in the last two decades and is now at the forefront of prevention exploration
for psychotic illness. As Yung and McGorry, pioneers in the research of prodromal
schizophrenia, have noted in one of their earliest works, in clinical medicine, a prodrome
refers to the early symptoms and signs of an illness that precede the characteristic
manifestations of the acute, fully developed illness (1996). As such, the term “prodrome”
in relation to psychotic illness originated as the concept of the pre-morbid phase of fullblown schizophrenia or psychosis.
History of the Prodrome
Many other diseases, syndromes or disorders have a prodromal phase, during
which a constellation of symptoms are measureable and lead to the debut of an illness.
The prodrome is more recently characterized as a set of clinical markers, including subclinical or attenuated symptoms, which are markers or risk factors signifying the phase
that predates the full blown disease. A simple medical example can be found in the
measles, where fever, coryzal symptoms, conjunctivitis, and cough signal the phase prior
to the full-blown disease. These markers are then followed by a very specific rash,
making definitive diagnosis possible (Yung & McGorry, 1996). Another notable example
in the medical field, Alzheimer’s disease, which is known to have a prodromal phase,
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characterized by Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and/or Mild Behavioral Impairment
(MBI) (Taragano et al., 2009). MCI and MBI are known markers that can be measured
and assessed as risk factors for dementia, the hallmark of Alzheimer’s disease, much as
attenuated psychotic symptoms have been the indicators of risk for psychosis, the
hallmark of schizophrenia. Notably, the word “prodrome” itself has semantic
connotations indicating that the development of the full-blown disorder is essentially
inevitable. However, regarding the development of frank psychosis, the term “prodrome”
is widely and nearly ubiquitously used to generally refer to increased clinical risk for
psychosis, rather than an identifiable pre-illness phase after which psychosis will indeed
onset. Efforts to prospectively identify the features of the prodrome to psychosis have
been variably successful, which will be discussed at length later in this chapter.
One of the earliest motivations to spark research in the area of prodromal
schizophrenia was to gain more exacting knowledge of the pathogenesis of psychosis.
The early research on the prodrome was initiated in the early to mid- 1990’s by several
groups of researchers across the globe. McGlashan illuminates that increased efficacy of
antipsychotic medication and an increasing understanding of the etiology and course of
schizophrenia allowed for a reemphasizing the direction of research towards early
identification (1996). It was hoped that researching the illness’s earliest detectable signs
would assist ongoing research in the origination of psychotic disorders. Researchers and
treating clinicians believed they had advanced dramatically in knowledge of
schizophrenia as a neuro-biological illness. More in-depth understanding of its
pathogenesis was simultaneously a motivation for research on its earliest course, at the
same time that this more current understanding of schizophrenia also served to make
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further research into the prodrome possible. The phenomena of psychotic illness at its
most nascent stage could be more clearly observed and understood in light of a clearer
vision of chronic psychotic phenomena and diagnostics. Conceptualizing schizophrenia
as a “brain disorder” of biological, genetic or neurochemical origin enabled researchers to
search for causes and treatments within a more conventional medical research model.
Despite advances in pharmacological treatments and promising evidence of genetic and
biological origins of the illness, treating and working with patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia, particularly chronic cases, was and remains notoriously difficult. The
mystery of understanding and treating schizophrenia is summed up by Thomas
McGlashan (1996), as he states “as a community of mental health providers and
consumers we celebrate the advances of pharmacotherapy, family psychoeducation, and
community-based care, but we also see treatment resistance and treatment failure. It is
resistance and failure that I wish to address” (p. 202).
Historical Influences on Prodromal Identification
Emil Kraepelin was a German psychiatrist who is credited with formalizing the
collection of symptoms known now as schizophrenia observed by many doctors,
particularly in the 19th century. The constellation of symptoms, at that time, was believed
to be an early form of dementia, leading to the nomenclature dementia praecox, or
“precocious dementia” (Lavretsky, 2008). The symptoms included catatonia and
hebrephenia. Kraepelin also recorded the presence of hallucinations in all five senses, but
auditory hallucinations were prominently noted (Lavretsky, 2008). Kraepelin believed
that dementia praecox was a disorder with specific neuropatholigcal origin. He also
differentiated between dementia praecox and manic-depressive illness, the former having
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a deteriorating course with marked disability in functioning and the latter a cyclical
pattern or mania and depression. A Kraepelin characterization of schizophrenic illness
has been highly influential in the direction of contemporary research, theory and
psychiatry in the West. The categories that Kraepelin observed and recorded continue to
guide our own diagnostic and clinical practice. Kraepelin noted in the late 1890s that over
70% of his patients suffering with dementia praecox had family history of psychosis
(Lavretsky, 2008).
Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler first used the term schizophrenia in 1911, which
quickly replaced dementia praecox. The term literally meant “a mind torn asunder”
(Lavretsky, 2008). Bleuler’s conceptualization of schizophrenia included the idea that
the illness incorporated a broad spectrum of disorders all sharing a psychological
underpinning. While Bleuler’s work in identifying and naming specific symptoms
remains in large part intact in our current diagnostic practices, he has also been cited as
bringing many heterogeneous clinical presentations under the same grouping of
schizophrenic disorders. This can account for the complex and varied diagnostic
categories included in most clinical manuals today.
First Episode Research and Early Identification of Prodromal Phenomena
Schizophrenia and psychotic disorders in general are known throughout
psychiatry and by mental health providers to be some of the most difficult, resistant and
costly illnesses to treat (Corcoran, 2008: Hafner, 2004). As long-term research on the
onset, treatment, and diagnosis of schizophrenia was joined with increasing evidence that
schizophrenia runs in families and appears to responds to medication especially in later
stages of the illness, many researchers and clinicians attempted to outline the
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vulnerability markers related to onset of schizophrenic illness (McGlashan, 1996).
Research on the first episode of psychosis was underway when interest in the prodrome
intensified, with qualitative and anecdotal retrospective evidence that the decline into the
first psychotic break was heralded by warning signs that may have been traceable
(McGlashan, 2001). Research revealed that there was a surprisingly long lag between the
first psychotic episode and the first presentation for treatment. The period of time
between first episode of psychosis and seeking of treatment is known and the Duration of
Untreated Psychosis and is discussed below.
Hafner and his colleagues, also significant contributors to early understanding of
prodromal syndromes, conceptualized early detection of the prodrome to psychotic
illness as “secondary prevention”, as it relies on the detection of subclinical symptoms
and risk factors later in life (usually adolescence), rather than on prenatal detection
through genetic testing (2004). Hafner further postulates that early intervention’s goals
are to prevent or postpone the onset of psychosis and to interrupt the course of the illness
after onset, which is generally believed to be a declining course (Castle & Morgan, 2008;
Lavretsky, 2008; Malla, 2004; McGlashan, 1996). Psychosis can and does frequently
remit spontaneously with or without treatment. However, many researchers believe that it
is rare that individuals experiencing psychosis and then remission ever return to their full
functioning level prior to their first episode (Hafner & an der Heiden, 2008).
Schizophrenia is generally understood to onset in late adolescence, with some variance,
including some early onset (earlier in adolescence) and late onset (in adulthood). For the
purposes of this study, most literature reviewed considered subjects between the ages of
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13 and 30. Reference to difference in age, gender, race or ethnicity was explored
minimally by researchers in the literature, but will be noted when relevant.
Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry, researchers and psychiatrists at the Early
Psychosis Prevention and Intervention Centre in Melbourne, Australia, established a
conceptualization of the initial prodrome in psychotic disorders, which has become the
foundation for ongoing research in the field. Their definition of the initial prodrome in
psychotic disorders refers to a period of disturbance which represents a deviation from a
person’s previous experience and behavior, occurring prior to the development of florid
features of frank psychosis (1996). This is a very broad definition and represents some of
the earliest understanding in the field of prodromal research. Yung and McGorry
believed early on that the prodrome could be thought of as either a pre-psychotic form of
an emergent psychotic disorder or as a syndrome that signals an increased risk or
vulnerability to psychosis (1996). The second way of thinking of the prodrome eludes to
the idea that psychosis is not an inevitable consequence of prodromal indicators. One of
the challenges of early prodromal research was the necessity of retrospective
identification of the hallmarks of the prodrome. This began at first with samples of
patients who had already had a first episode of psychosis retrospectively reporting their
experiences leading up to their first frank psychotic episode. The first episode marked the
baseline by which pre-morbid functioning and subsequent symptomology could be
measured.
Initial Instruments for Prodromal Assessment
In Yung and McGorry’s pioneering work on retrospective analysis of prodromal
features, instruments were designed specifically for interviewing patients about their past
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prodromal experiences, as no tested measures existed at that time. Dr. Yung designed the
Multidimensional Assessment of Psychotic Prodrome interview based on literature
review and her own clinical experience. She further drew on the prodromal checklist
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III-R (1987), which is also discussed later in
this chapter. The validity of her measures was not established, but her exploration of
participants’ retrospective experiences was significant, as these individuals had
confirmed cases of psychosis at the time of inquiry. Twenty-one patients and/or their
informants were interviewed regarding the prodromal period before they became floridly
psychotic. According to this early study, a wide variance in prodromal features was
discovered. However, sleep disturbance was universal among all participants. Anxiety,
irritability depressed mood, impaired role functioning, social withdrawal, poor
concentration, suspicion and lack of motivation were all noted in over two-thirds of the
individuals. The authors summarize these early findings on the prodrome to include
attenuated positive symptoms (i.e. perceptual changes, suspiciousness), non-specific
neurotic and mood-related symptoms and behavioral changes (Yung & McGorry, 1996).
Of note, many of the participants appeared to show signs of affective illness. Later
research aimed to explore the phenomena of the prodrome to non-affective psychotic
illness. Some of the import of the earliest research is found in the narrowing of the
research populations and criteria, given the high diversity and variability of this and other
studies’ results.
Primarily basing features of the prodrome on DSM-III-R prodromal symptoms
was not a successful diagnostic approach, as it failed to avoid the same high variance and
broad categorization of “prodromal features,” making narrowing down to actual
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prospective identification difficult. In fact, the DSM-IV-R eliminated the prodromal
symptoms checklist from the 1994 edition. However, researchers did not abandon
attempts to develop prodromal identification measures based on the retrospective work
begun by Hafner and Yung and McGorry.
Diagnostic Foundation
It should be noted that in order to define the prodrome to a disorder, the
diagnostic criteria for the disorder itself must be examined. Therefore, it is certainly
important to differentiate between psychosis and full-blown schizophrenia and to
understand the phenomena of these clinical states in order to fully investigate the
prodrome to these states. A thorough and exhaustive exploration of the diagnostic
categories included in the spectrum of disorders under schizophrenia and psychotic
illness is far beyond the scope of this study. Further, a critical analysis of current
diagnostic trends is also not included, despite the fact that diagnostic trends and biases
greatly influence the population addressed in this study. It is important to keep in mind
that diagnostic categories and illnesses change over time, as research and social forces are
applied. However, it is also important to understand the generally accepted categorically
clinical manifestations of the entities being discussed. For the purposes of the current
study, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) series will serve
as the primary diagnostic tool for defining and categorizing symptomology. The DSM
III-R states that schizophrenia always includes delusions, hallucinations, or certain
characteristic disturbances in affect and the form of thought (APA, 1987).
Diagnostically, psychotic symptoms, or “psychosis,” are said to be the defining feature of
schizophrenia and other psychotic illnesses. According to the 1994 edition of the
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), that while psychosis
may be present in other illnesses or may result from the onset of other disorders, it is
understood to be a symptom and not the definitive diagnostic feature. For example,
psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions may be present in Major
Depressive Disorder, the major diagnostic differentiation is that major depressive
symptoms are the prevailing clinical presentation (APA, 1994). Psychosis in the 1994
manual was most specifically defined as the presence of delusions or hallucinations,
occurring in the absence of insight into the pathological etiology of these symptoms.
More broadly, psychotic symptoms could include hallucinations that were recognized as
such. Other understandings included more positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as
disorganized speech or impaired behaviorally functioning. Overall, psychosis was
characterized as the “loss of ego boundaries” or “gross impairment in reality testing,”
which were earlier conceptualizations also included in the DSM-III. Most editions of the
manual include some minimal criteria for duration of symptoms.
More recent criteria for full-blown schizophrenia include both “positive” and
“negative” symptoms. Generally, positive symptoms are defined as “an excess or
distortion of normal functions”, while negative symptoms “reflect a diminution or loss of
normal functions” (APA, 2000). Distortions of thought (delusions), perception
(hallucinations), language and thought processes (disorganized speech), and impaired
behavior (disorganized or catatonic) are included in positive symptom categories.
Negative symptoms include restrictive emotional expression and intensity (affective
flattening), restricted thought and speech patterns (alogia), restriction of goal-directed
behavior (avolition) and restriction of experiencing pleasure (anhedonia) (2000).
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Declining Course of Illness Framework
Another important piece of groundwork for understanding psychosis that has
influenced how prodromal research has progressed is the “duration of untreated illness”
model. The length of time that psychosis is not treated is believed to contribute greatly to
the course and long-term outcomes of the illness; the longer treatment is postponed after
the first episode of clinically significant symptoms the more negative the outcomes have
been noted (Hafner & an der Heiden, 2008). The period between when even slight
behavioral or functioning changes are first noticed, known as pre-morbid functioning,
and the first episode of florid or frank psychosis is of special importance, as it appears to
have implications for long-term recovery and/or relapse. Based on a neuro-developmental
model of psychosis and schizophrenia, psychosis is understood to be a declining course
illness that if left untreated would only result in less favorable outcomes. While florid
positive psychotic symptoms may remit with little or no intervention, rarely do
individuals retain their previous levels of functioning, particularly in social interaction,
work and role functioning and affect expression (Addington & Addington, 2008). Malla
et al. conducted a study in which they reported that the Duration of Untreated Psychosis
(DUP) was predictive of less favorable indicator measurements in level of remission,
positive, negative, depression and anxiety symptoms in short to mid-term patient
outcomes (at least a year after seeking treatment) (2001). Later studies focused on longerterm outcomes. Harris et al., researchers located at the University of Melbourne and
associated with ORYGEN, a specialized early psychosis service facility where the
original first episode psychosis (EPPIC) and prodromal early intervention treatment
center, the Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation (PACE) clinic, conducted a large
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scale prospective study of first episode psychosis patients over an eight year period. The
study revealed that shorter DUP is significantly associated with decreased severity of
positive symptoms, and enhanced social and occupational functioning and quality of life
(Harris et al., 2005). This study also indicated that DUP was not associated with negative
symptoms, which were more likely to be impacted by premorbid adjustment (2005).
Other long-term studies have corroborated the DUP theory that outcomes in patients tend
to be less favorable the longer the duration before first psychiatric treatment is sought
(Bottlender & Moller, 2003). As a body of literature, these studies have been used as
evidence in support of further investigation into early detection, identification and
intervention for psychosis and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, namely to move
forward in identifying the prodrome prospectively. As Barnaby Nelson and Alison Yung
summarize from their research and anecdotal experience as clinicians serving patients
suffering with psychosis, early intervention is crucial as individuals experiencing early
phases of psychosis or the prodrome may be more like to engage in treatment before
psychotic symptoms are entrenched, social networks are dissolved or disrupted and
functioning has deteriorated significantly (2008).
Narrowing Measures for Identification of the Prodrome
As secondary prevention, as Hafner described it, became the emphasis of
prodromal researchers, it was incumbent on researchers to identify the features prodrome
objectively. In order to develop consistent and reliable measures for identification of this
clinical state, clinical trials were arranged with the goal of measuring the rate of
conversion to psychosis among the sample. This population could then be identified and
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diagnosed as pre-psychotic or at risk for developing psychosis. Ultimately, researchers
goal was the development of interventions that were justifiable clinically, ethically, and
economically. As motivation became focused on the potential for preventative treatment
and early intervention before full blown-psychosis onsets, research quickly shifted
towards the development and testing of clinical measures that can be used to identify
patients who are prodromal.
Vulnerability to psychosis has long been thought to apply to more people than
ever become fully psychotic, a concept supported in early Kraepelian theory of
schizophrenia. The belief that psychosis could appear among individuals who were
already at specific risk and who were exposed to particular acute stressors was long held
by both doctors and the public in general. This led to the notion that a “nervous
breakdown” or “psychotic break” was the result of environmental factors conflated with a
pre-existing capacity for psychosis. Researchers set about attempting to identify what
placed an individual at risk for such a break.
Genetic predisposition to schizophrenia was accepted as scientific fact as early as
the mid-1990s and marked a clear direction in research, since isolating a genotype that
carried the illness seemed quite possible at that time (McGlashan, 1996). Since then,
many researchers have searched for a schizophrenic phenotype. Despite this certainty, a
purely genetic cause of psychotic illness has not been made clear. However, genetic risk
remains one of the biggest markers for prediction of psychosis as definitive measures for
identifying the prodrome have tested. The hereditary, or at least, the familial nature of
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders is still considered to be one of the most
widely accepted theories of causality and prospective risk identification.

24

Other vulnerability markers that were identified through retrospective research
included brief psychotic symptoms, sub-clinical or attenuated psychotic symptoms and
decline in role functioning (McGlashan 1996). Some studies also indicated that
neurocognitive abnormalities and behavioral signs are markers of the prodrome or of
clinical high-risk states. Subtle neurocognitive deficits may predate the onset of
attenuated psychotic symptoms (Cornblatt, 2001).
According to the North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study research teams,
five features appeared uniquely connected to the prediction of psychosis from baseline
presentation. Participants were help-seeking prodromal or at-risk individuals. These five
features were: genetic risk with recent deterioration in functioning, higher levels of
unusual thought content, higher levels of suspicion/paranoia, greater social impairment
and a history of substance abuse (Cannon et al., 2008). Retrospective recording of premorbid presentation of these vulnerability markers were the focus of creation of
diagnostic measures for the prodrome.
Regarding specifiable diagnostic categories for the identification of the prodromal
phase of psychotic disorders, including schizophrenia, only the DSM-III-R is notable for
including prodromal symptomology. Although this DSM version was completed and
published in 1987, long before the bulk of prodromal research began in the late 1990s, it
is indicative of the direction clinical research and retrospective identification of risk
factors were headed. The DSM-III-R’s broadly defined list of prodromal symptoms are
marked by a “clear deterioration from a previous level of functioning” and is
characterized by “social withdrawal, impairment in role functioning, peculiar behavior,
neglect of personal hygiene and grooming, blunted or inappropriate affect, disturbances
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in communication, bizarre ideation, unusual perceptual experiences, and lack of initiative,
interests and energy” (1987). The manual recognizes both the retrospective nature of this
diagnostic criteria and the variability in length and nature of the prodromal phase.
Diagnosing the prodrome, therefore, rests heavily on our diagnostic categories,
criteria and concepts of psychosis and schizophrenic disorders as defined in the most
current diagnostic manual. The most reliable way to define the prodrome was initially to
identify it as a retrospective entity relative to conversion to psychosis. In other words,
individuals who had developed frank psychosis and who themselves could or had
relatives who assisted in reporting their functioning and clinical issues prior to onset were
asked to discuss the pre-psychotic phase of their illness. In one such retrospective study,
researchers interviewed subjects who were in the recovery phase after their acute first
episode of psychosis. Participants were asked about the period leading up to the
psychosis, using a combination of unstructured and semi-structured techniques.
Symptoms identified retrospectively were a varied mixture of attenuated psychotic
symptoms, neurotic and mood-related symptoms, and behavioral changes. Symptoms
were often disabling and some, such as suicidal thoughts, potentially life-threatening.
(Yung & McGorry, 1996).
Patients who are considered Ultra High Risk (UHR) or potentially prodromal are
being screened by a number of different measures, all primarily based on the three
syndromes retrospectively identified by Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry, both based
out of the ORYGEN Youth Health facility in Melbourne, Australia. Yung and McGorry
(1996) pioneered three distinct prodromal syndromes that are thought to all potentially
lead to full-blown psychotic illness. The first syndrome, as well as the most common
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among prodromal patients, is the Attenuated Positive Symptoms category (APS), which
accounts for sub-clinical or prodromal, positive symptoms that have begun in the last
year but have not met the criteria for severity. The second syndrome is Brief Intermittent
Psychotic Symptoms (BIPS) syndrome, which involves the presence of recent-onset,
psychotic-level syptoms that occur for less than one week and spontaneously remit.
Lastly, the third syndrome identified by Yung and McGorry’s research is the Genetic
Risk and Deterioration (GRD) category, which is determined if the patient has
schizotypal personality disorder or a first degree relative with a psychotic disorder, in
addition to a 30 % decline in functioning over the last month. It is possible for patients to
be categorized in two different syndromes. Based on the above three syndromes, it is
clear that biological, psychological and social forces are currently understood to impact
the onset of putative psychosis. Meeting the criteria for the prodrome is a diagnosis that
describes individuals who are at “ultra-high” clinical risk for developing psychosis.
The PACE clinic (Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation) in Melbourne,
Australia was one of the first sites devoted to the assessment, diagnosis and treatment of
the prodrome. The researchers located at this clinic in Melbourne established the reliable
measure, the Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental States (CAARMS), which is
a semi-structured interview designed to identify and assess the UHR criteria in
individuals presenting with potentially prodromal symptoms (Yung, 2005). The
CAARMS is generally used in European and Australian studies and clinics. The
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS) measure includes
recent onset of functional decline, genetic risk, and attenuated (subclinical) or brief
threshold psychosis (Bota, 2008; Yung, 2008). The CAARMS were used in several
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studies to assess three separate trait groups of at-risk individuals. The first group includes
Attenuated (sub-threshold) Psychotic Symptoms (APS). This group experiences
symptoms of thought disorder, particularly the presence of hallucinations or delusional
beliefs that do not meet the full criteria for psychosis in either severity or conviction
(Yung, 2005; Yung et al., 2008). For example, a threshold level delusion might be that an
individual believed that the U.S. government had launched a satellite with the specific
intent of following that individual’s whereabouts and tracking their thoughts. In contrast,
a sub-threshold level of this delusion might be that a government satellite was indeed
launched and the individual worried with regularity that the satellite perhaps was being
used to track him. In the sub-threshold case, the individual was still able to identify the
feelings and thoughts as his own cognitions that he could believe or not. The difference in
the two levels in this case is in the conviction of the belief and its origin. The second trait
group identifiable through the CAARMS is the Brief Limited Intermittent Psychotic
Symptoms group (BLIPS). The BLIPS group includes individuals whose symptoms
spontaneously remit within twelve months. The third group assessed with the CAARMS
is the presumed genetic vulnerability group. This group is also assessed using another
measure- the Family Interview for Genetic Studies (FIGS)- and includes a family history
of psychotic disorder in a first degree relative or a diagnosis of Schizotypal Personality
Disorder in the at-risk individual (Yung et al., 2008).
The above definition of the three syndromes of the prodrome has also been
operationalized by McGlashan et al. at the PRIME Clinic at Yale’s Department of
Psychiatry in the SIPS/SOPS measure. The SIPS/SOPS is currently the leading measure
used in North American Studies and clinics. The Structured Interview for Prodromal
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Symptoms (SIPS) measure includes assessment of onset or worsening of subclinical
positive symptoms in five categories, including unusual thought content,
suspicion/paranoia, perceptual anomalies, grandiosity, and disorganized communication
and was found to be a valid measure (Miller et al., 2003), with a conversion rate of 50%
(7 of the 14 of individuals identified as prodromal using SIPS were psychotic at after
twelve months). This is in comparison to other studies where conversion to psychosis has
been predicted with varying success. Further, the above study also examined the
interrater reliability of administering the SIPS/SOPS interviews. The measures were
shown to have excellent inter-rater reliability, meaning that once trained in assessment
using the SIPS/SOPS, clinicians were nearly always in agreement in diagnosing the
prodrome (Miller et al., 2003).
Generally, in combined studies of the predictive power of assessment measures,
the SIPS and CAARMS have been recorded as identifying patients who will convert to
psychosis at rates between 40%-60% (Bota, 2008; Yung et al., 2003).
Between 2000 and 2003, the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) funded
a multisite collaborative study called “Prevention and Early Intervention in Psychotic
Disorders,” which focused on refining prodromal diagnostic criteria and improving the
predictive power of these measures. This North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study
(NAPLS) involved collaboration by eight individual research sites. The SIPS/SOPS
criteria were universally used in assessing whether participants met prodromal criteria.
Once diagnosed as prodromal in relation to one of the three prodromal syndromes,
participants were followed for two and a half years. The results were a 35.3% conversion
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rate, meaning that about 35 % of participants identified on the basis of recent onset or
worsening of subsyndromal psychotic symptoms experienced conversion to psychosis
after two and a half year follow-up (Cannon et al., 2008). The NAPLS data set was more
broadly used to establish a common set of diagnostic characteristics for examining the
prodrome, namely the SIPS approach, when applied to help-seeking individuals, those at
genetic/familial risk and a normal comparison group (Addington, 2007).
In order to successfully create the above measures, it was necessary to recruit
potentially prodromal individuals, assess them using the most current version of the
instrument in question, follow the individual for a period of time and then reassess the
individual to see if they have indeed converted to psychosis, as meeting prodromal
criteria might suggest. A wide variance in the conversion prediction rates is noted, as
discussed above. Further, the nature of the sample and recruitment strategies should
briefly be reflected upon, as it is helpful in understanding the nature of early intervention
in psychosis. Firstly, most studies in the literature enlist individuals who are help-seeking
and screened for psychosis risk indicators, so many of the conversion rates can not be
applied to general population samples as a way of screening for psychosis risk (Cannon et
al., 2008). Another consideration is the possibility of “false-positive” diagnosis, which is
certainly of concern if treatment interventions are to be explored.
CASE MATERIAL
The following case is drawn from the casework of Dr. Cheryl Corcoran, who is a
psychiatrist and researcher of note in the field of prodromal schizophrenia identification
and treatment (Corcoran, 2009). The case is a good illustration of how complex
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diagnosing the prodrome can be, particularly regarding differential diagnosis, cultural
relevance and theoretical framework.
Identifying Information
James is a 15-year-old adolescent boy who was referred for social withdrawal,
declining school function, some depressive symptoms and school refusal. He lives with
his mother and older brother. He was referred by his school counselor.

Chief Complaint
“I don’t know why my school wanted me to come here today.”
History of Present Illness
James has always been somewhat shy and awkward, although he has had some
close friends and has maintained an A-B average in school until recently. His mother,
who accompanied him to the initial interview, reports that during his recent summer
vacation, he spent a few weeks in July visiting extended family in South Carolina, where
he spent time with his cousins, hanging out and playing basketball. When he returned
home to New York City, his local friends called to invite him to go to the movies, to play
basketball, etc. He usually declined, saying it was too hot to go outside. Instead, James
stayed in his room for up to ten hours at a time, watching cartoon channel episodes and
playing multiplayer online games. Rather than joining his family for dinner, he would
take food up to his room and eat alone. James began to stay up all night and sleep during
the day. His room became increasingly messy, he changed his clothes less often and
showered every other day, only after his began nagging him to do so. For his birthday, his
mother offered to take him to his favorite restaurant, but he was resistant to do this. She
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coaxed him to go and he reluctantly agreed. In the car on the way to dinner, he slumped
in the backseat, covering his face with his hand. At the restaurant, he kept his menu
throughout the meal, hiding his face by holding it upright. He ate all of the shrimp in his
favorite dish, but without his usual delight.
With the start of the new school year, James’ mother was optimistic that he would
improve. In the first few weeks of September, he went to school daily and did most of his
homework. When he returned home from school he went straight to his room, where he
remained on his computer for hours. His room was still quite messy and he showered and
changed clothes only with repeated prodding.

By October, he had become somewhat irritable, especially with a younger niece
who wanted to spend more time with him. His clear preference was to be alone. His
friends had stopped calling him. His mother said it was like he had become a stranger,
unlike himself, and she worried he might be using drugs or if this was just adolescence.
His first report card revealed almost all C’s. His teachers reported he was very quiet in
class, typically looking out the window or doodling and drawing. His English teacher saw
his drawings and reported they were full of nihilistic themes, including images of
explosions and violence. Although James could generally complete other types of
assignments, he had particular difficulty with writing assignments. He would write a first
sentence and then stop, saying he was not sure what else to add. At school, the janitor
found him sitting alone in the bathroom after hours; James could not or would not say
why he was there.
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By December, James refused to go to school, and again would not say why.
Resorting to desperate measures, his mother locked him out of the apartment during the
day so that he would go to school. When she returned from work, she found him just
sitting quietly on the porch of their home. At the school’s urging, James’ mother brought
him in for a psychiatric evaluation.

Past Psychiatric History
In the past, James reportedly had a diagnosis of “inattention without
hyperactivity.”

Medical History
James was the product of a full-term, normal vaginal delivery. He had mild
asthma as a young boy, for which he was prescribed albuterol inhalers. He has not
received steroids, required emergency room admission or been intubated as a result of his
asthma.

Developmental History
As an infant and toddler, James was a much easier baby than his brother, who had
been colicky. His mother reports that when she took him shopping, he would sit in the
cart quietly. James began walking at 14 months. His mother thinks he may have started
speaking a little later than his brother, but she is not sure. James responded well to
cuddling and played with other children. He has always been a little clumsy and less
athletic and outgoing than his brother.
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When James went to preschool and then kindergarten, he separated easily from
his mother, but his teachers noted he was a little shy and needed to be drawn out. He
rarely initiated play with other children but joined in when invited. His mother describes
him as being more compliant and less mischievous than his brother.
James was referred for evaluation in the second grade for inattention without
hyperactivity. The reports were lost, but his mother recalls that James was prescribed a
stimulant of unknown dose for a brief period, which was not particularly helpful. Of note,
James was taller than the other boys in his class- “like a gentle giant”- and other children
provoked and teased him to see if he would respond. His teachers all liked him
immensely and tried to protect him, as they perceived him to be somewhat vulnerable.
James’ school performance over several years was marked by A’s and B’s,
compliance, and the development of friendships, although he was somewhat shy and
awkward.

Social History
James lives in a one-bedroom apartment in northern Manhattan with his mother
and older brother, with whom he shares a bedroom. James has never known his father.
When was age 3, he was in foster care for a few months with his brother when his mother
was hospitalized (see below). He has no history of abuse or neglect. The family is
supported by his mother’s salary as a secretary and some income from his older brother.
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Family History
James’ mother was hospitalized 25 years ago for an episode of psychosis, which
has never recurred. James’ mother said that she thought she was hearing the voice of an
older uncle, named Jimmy Carter, who had recently died. She said the doctors mistakenly
thought she was having auditory hallucinations of the U.S. president. She was given
chlorpromazine briefly and discharged within a few weeks. The symptoms have not
recurred, and she has not taken any additional psychiatric medications or received any
care since the hospitalization.

Mental Status Examination
James appeared younger than his stated age ad was quite slender. He wore ageappropriate clothing, including a basketball jersey and jeans, and a baseball hat on
backwards. He appeared awkward and shy and sat quietly while his mother described the
course of events leading up to the evaluation.
When interviewed alone, James was compliant with the interview, answering all
questions. He maintained fair eye contact and spoke softly, smiling occasionally while
tapping his foot. He described his mood as “OK”. His thought pattern was a bit tangential
and at times odd.
When asked about the past few months, James acknowledged that he did prefer to
be by himself. He felt uncomfortable around others. He was not sure how to act with his
friends and he did not think they liked him much anymore. In crowds, he felt like people
looked at him and thought he was weird or menacing, especially as a young, tall black
male. He was not sure whether he should make eye contact with others. His
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neighborhood felt increasingly dangerous, and he felt like he had to look over his
shoulder. On the other hand, he did not feel like anyone had singled him out or was
plotting against him in any way.
James also reported that he had been thinking a lot about politics, and he thought
U.S. society as a whole was controlled by television and mass marketing. He thought
George Bush was a “jerk” and wondered if George Bush had something to do with the
9/11 attacks so he could get a lot of power. James acknowledged a lot of fantasizing
about blowing up the world- building a tube to the center of the earth and dropping a
nuclear bomb- so that all the mistakes and problems would be erased. On the other hand,
James has considered that a better approach would be to become a rap star and spread the
message of God and love and peace instead.
James also described having feelings of déjà vu every few months, and also
wondering if he had dreamed about things before they happened, such as a teacher’s
being absent from school. He also felt sometimes that if he saw a white car drive by,
something bad might happen. He though these were strange ideas that did not make much
sense, and he was not sure why he thought them. He confirmed that his thoughts were
clearly his own and he did not feel controlled by anyone or anything else.
When asked about sensory perceptions, James acknowledged that when he
returned to New York City from South Carolina in the summer, the city seemed much
louder and smellier and dirtier than before. Therefore, he preferred to stay in the
apartment. Sometimes, he thought he heard his name in the wind. Late at night, when he
was in his bedroom, he sometimes thought he saw a black object moving briefly in the
periphery of his vision. However, he denied any voices or any other type of hallucination.
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As this case material demonstrates, diagnostic work on the prodrome is complex
and requires in-depth exploration of clinical phenomena. Many different theoretical
frameworks could be applied to this case in order to understand the patient and his
experience. The implications for treatment are also riddled with complexity. For instance,
if James was not actually at risk for developing psychosis, yet he and his mother were
informed that this was a possibility, it may have deleterious effects because of increased
stigma and shame associated with serious mental illness. Treatment with psychotropic
medication in a false positive case is certainly an ethical concern, as the side effects of
both conventional neuroleptics and atypical antipsychotics are serious and must be
weighed with the benefits of the medication.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COGNITIVE THEORY
In this chapter I will first outline the broad biopsychosocial framework before
introducing cognitive theory and the closely related approach of cognitive-behavioral
therapy. I will then use this lens to examine the case of James once again.
The Primacy of the Medical Model of Psychiatry
Schizophrenia is a disorder for which myriad theories have been developed. As a
spectrum of illnesses, it is remarkably complex and not well understood, despite intensive
investment in formulating research to discern its etiology. Traditionally, there has been
tension between biological and environmental causal understandings of psychosis and
schizophrenia. Medical psychiatry has dominated the field in treatment and research for
the last several decades, thereby also dominating the narrative of the disorder’s origin. By
holding the claim that schizophrenia and psychosis have purely biological roots, broad
implications follow for understanding and treating the prodrome of the illness.
Conceiving schizophrenia as a “brain disease” over which the sufferer has little or no
control has come to be the predominant framework of schizophrenia that psychiatrists,
families, clinicians, patients and the general public understand. Thus, the prodrome has
been highlighted recently, as it appears to give clinicians the opportunity to interrupt the
natural biological course of psychosis with a more advanced knowledge of schizophrenia
and its onset and treatment. In fact, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has
adopted the “brain disease” narrative as a way of supporting families, patients and the
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public in their understanding of this complicated and confusing group of illnesses
(Torrey, 1995). The biological “brain disease” theory of schizophrenia has been widely
publicized and lauded by psychiatrists. As E. Fuller Torrey (1995) writes in his seminal
work, Surviving Schizophrenia, read broadly by families and professionals, states, “there
is no evidence whatsoever that schizophrenia is caused by how people have been treated
either as children or as adults; it is a biological disease of the brain, unrelated to
interpersonal events of childhood or adulthood” (p. 142).
It is from this backdrop that I approach our first theoretical perspective on the
prodrome. The biological disease model for psychotic illness has many limits, despite its
primacy as the dominant narrative in the popular and clinical understandings of
psychosis. The biological model has been broadened by many researchers and clinicians
in order to incorporate the complexity of clinical presentation of psychotic illness and
subsequently, the prodrome. In this chapter, I will lay out the broad framework of the
biopsychosocial model of schizophrenia. I will then move into an in-depth exploration of
cognitive theory and its correlate, cognitive-behavioral theory. These theories will be
discussed and then will be used to frame an understanding of schizophrenia and psychotic
disorders in general. Cognitive theory and its close relative, cognitive-behavioral theory,
will then be used to examine and broaden our understanding of the prodrome to
schizophrenia. Research and literature related to the theory’s application to both
psychotic illness and the prodrome will be reviewed. Lastly, the case of James will be
considered with a broad biopsychosocial and specifically cognitive theoretical lens.
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Biopsychosocial Model
Biological explanations for schizophrenic illness have more recently been
adjusted to account for the lack of specificity in narrowing in on any one biological
theory. For instance, researchers have spent many years attempting to isolate a gene or to
identify a specific neurotransmitter that can explain the symptoms and etiology of
schizophrenia. Further, the notion that “stress”, psychological, social and other types,
does in fact preempt most relapses of psychosis, as well as first episodes of psychosis is
more widely accepted currently. Environmental influences on this spectrum of
presentations have been noted in many studies. For instance, schizophrenia has a higher
incidence in urban areas (Castle & Morgan, 2008). It has also been evidenced that darkskinned emigrants who immigrate to areas where the population is primarily lightskinned have a higher rate of developing schizophrenia (Shean, 2004). This evidence has
lead many researchers to expand the knowledge base regarding the cause and onset of
psychotic illness to include risk factors beyond genetic vulnerability. Therefore, it has
now become quite commonplace for clinicians, psychiatrists and researchers alike to call
upon a biopsychosocial model in understanding the etiology and development of
schizophrenia and more specifically the prodrome to schizophrenia. This chapter will
outline the relevant biological, psychological and social theoretical models of psychotic
illness and its prodrome, in order to orient the reader to the broader context of the
cognitive theoretical approach. This chapter will then explore in depth one specific
theoretical model from within the broader biospsychosocial context, specifically the
cognitive-behavioral approach, which originates in cognitive theory, as it applies to
prodromal schizophrenia.
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Most research aimed at understanding psychotic illness, its cause, onset and
outcomes emanates from the fundamental acceptance of the biopsychosocial model of
schizophrenic illness. By accepting this theoretical orientation, research conclusions
accept many assumptions about the nature of the phenomena being researched. Many of
these factors will be discussed below. However, I find it important to make the reader
aware of these theoretical assumptions and how they overlay the following factors of the
biopsychosocial model and cognitive theory. First, it is assumed that schizophrenia is a
clinical entity with psychosis its core clinical manifestation. There has been research
suggesting the notion that schizophrenia is spectrum of illnesses or not a clear diagnostic
category as it is laid out in diagnostic manuals. The research reviewed below, particularly
regarding the diagnosis of schizophrenia, assumes that the diagnostic criteria in the DSM
IV-R are correct. These underlying assumptions greatly influence the way prodromal
research is conducted. Identification is based on current diagnostic categories and a
biospychosocial model of disease.
Genetic Factors
It is generally accepted that schizophrenia runs in families. For many years,
geneticists insisted that a gene could be identified that carried the heritable pathology for
schizophrenia. However, endeavors to narrow to this gene have been unsuccessful and it
is now more generally accepted that many genes have the capacity to carry the latent
illness, but such genetic predisposition plays only a small part in the actually advent of
the disease (Beck et al., 2009; Glatt, 2008). Genetic factors may be considered necessary,
sufficient or contributing to risk for schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Shean, 2004).
There are some researchers who insist that genetic factors are primary in the causation of
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schizophrenia. However, this has not been substantiated in the research and most cases of
schizophrenia disorders are considered to have other contributing environmental factors
that “trigger” any underlying genetic vulnerability (Glatt, 2008).
Gene studies, including twin studies and adoption studies, have helped to confirm
that there is a higher occurrence of schizophrenia in those with relatives with this
diagnosis. In fact, having a first-degree relative with the illness does increase the rate of
schizophrenia prevalence by a factor of at least 10 (from 1% to 9-13%) (Gottesman &
Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 2001). Generally speaking, the closer in degree relation an
individual is to a relative with schizophrenia, the higher that individual’s risk for
developing the disorder (Glatt, 2008).
As discussed in the last chapter, identifying the prodrome to psychosis has been
most easily predicted when genetic risk is considered among other assessment tools.
Thus, it is clear that the role of a familial or heritable condition plays a significant role in
the earliest notable expressions of psychotic illness. Those at highest risk have a firstdegree relative with psychotic illness as well as recent deterioration in functioning,
comprising the prodromal syndrome group of Genetic Risk plus Deterioration (GRD;
Miller et al., 2003).
Neurodevelopmental Factors
Schizophrenia has, of late, been broadly understood to be a neurodevelopmental
disorder. This view of the illness purports that schizophrenia or psychotic illness is the
result of the confluence of a basic biological error (likely prenatal injury or illness) and
genetic influence or risk, all of which combine to create “structural, functional, and/or
biochemical abnormalities in the developing brain” (Cornblatt, 2001). These
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abnormalities amount to a biological predisposition or vulnerability to psychotic illness
later in life. This vulnerability may be triggered by stressors in adolescence, as onset
usually occurs in late-adolescence/early adulthood (Cornblatt, 2008). As schizophrenia is
an illness with typical onset in adolescence or early adulthood, it is widely believed that
part of its course is connected with brain development and neural “paring” that occurs in
adolescence (Shean, 2004; Stewart & Davis, 2008).
Stress-Diathesis or Stress-Vulnerability Model
As discussed in the previous chapter, researchers have agreed on three distinct
prodromal syndromes; the Genetic Risk with Deterioration (GRD) syndrome, the
Attenuated Positive Symptoms syndrome (APS), and the Brief Limited Psychotic
Symptoms (BLIPS) syndrome. One of the most helpful ways to conceive of the
biopsychosocial model broadly is to approach the entirety of the model not as a specific
theoretical perspective, but as an integration of many varying theories and etiological
frameworks. Thus, the stress-diathesis, or stress-vulnerability, model essentially is the
title given to any collection of biological, social and psychological theories for
schizophrenia. When conceived in this way, it is certainly a model underpinning much of
prodromal research and intervention. Of the three prodromal syndromes outlined in the
previous chapter and mentioned about, the GRD syndrome appears to be most predictive
of ultra high risk for psychosis. The two other syndromes require at least the presence of
subclinical or brief positive psychotic symptoms, thereby indicating that psychotic
processes may have begun. Vulnerability, however, can refer generally to any inborn or
acquired traits that may predispose one for developing schizophrenia. It has been
established that many more people in the general population develop psychotic-like
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symptoms and never develop frank psychosis or schizophrenia (Sass, 1999; Davidson,
2003). Further, other psychiatric states include the presence of psychotic
symptomatology, but are not defined by the presence of psychotic symptoms in the way
that schizophrenia is. Thus, the presence of attenuated symptoms is not seemingly as
strong an indicator for risk for psychosis as genetic risk is.
The graphic flow chart below is one way of conceptualizing the stress-diathesis
model in relation to the prodrome. While the visual aid might suggest that psychiatric
outcome is inevitable, the pathways represented below refer to possible outcomes given
certain vulnerabilities. Further, what the chart does not clarify are protective, mediating
or resiliency factors (Chart drawn from Niendam, Jalbrzikowski & Bearden, 2009)
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Research does indicate that other vulnerabilities may be indicative of
predisposition to schizophrenia. As discussed above, these include prenatal and perinatal
injuries or illnesses, neurodevelopmental irregularities or functional or structural brain
abnormalities may exist in neo-natal or early childhood, well prior to the onset of the
prodrome. While the presence of the anomalies is widespread and detectable, it is not
entirely ubiquitous and homogeneous, once again pointing to the notion that
schizophrenia is perhaps not a single clinical entity, nor is its cause.
The stress-vulnerability model allows for a broad range of interaction between
biological and environmental factors. Most researchers and clinicians have focused on the
interaction between genetic and experiential factors. As these factors collide and interact,
it is important to be mindful that this is not a passive process. The process of the collision
of vulnerability to psychosis and the experiential “stressors” is most readily observed in
the clinical presentation of the prodrome, where psychotic processes are nascent but not
fully developed or entrenched. The hope of intervening in this process has led many to
research methods of treatment in this phase, as will be discuss later in this chapter. One
theoretical perspective that lays out a framework for understanding the very process by
which the vulnerability towards psychosis and stressors in the environment or in
experiential phenomena interact is cognitive theory. Cognitive theory not only can be
used to explicate the very course of psychotic symptomatology from the prodromal phase
into chronic psychotic illness, but also offers treatment intervention in the form of
cognitive-behavioral therapy. Cognitive theory is explored below.
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Cognitive Theory
Cognitive theory is often understood most readily in relation to its clinical
implementation in cognitive therapy (CT) and cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). CT
emerged as an alternative to strict behavioral therapies and to insight-oriented
psychodynamic therapy. CBT emerged as a confluence of cognitive theory and earlier
applications of behavioral treatments.
Cognitive theory is based on the fundamental principle that information
processing is the defining feature of human life. Cognition, the act of processing
information and forming meaning through thoughts and representations, is the primary
way that humans make sense of their world, both internal and external (Clark, 2009).
According to cognitive theory, then, humans respond to their mental representations of
their internal and external environment, rather than directly responding to the
environment. Just as the environment can change and shift mental representations in the
form of beliefs, attitudes, cognitions, thoughts and interpretations, so too can the mental
representations be changed, altered or evaluated. Cognitive theory allows us to describe
and make sense of the various cognitions and processes that characterize acute
psychiatric symptomatology. It also is useful in proposing certain pre-existing states or
vulnerability markers that can be predictive of future psychopathology (Clark, 2009). In
this way, it is certainly in line with early intervention efforts in prodomal psychotic
illness, particularly within the biopsychosocial, or stress-diathesis, framework. As Clark
states, the underlying cognitive vulnerability “remains latent and inactive until triggered
by a relevant life experience” (2009).
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One of the important concepts within cognitive theory is that of schemas, which
refer to cognitive structures that are persistent. Schemas are long-term internal
representations of “stimuli, ideas or experience that organize and integrate new
information in a meaningful manner” (Clark, 2009). For those predisposed to
psychopathology, cognitive theorists propose that maladaptive schemas exist as a result
of genetic, biological, developmental, learning and many other factors and experiences.
These experiences lead people to come to meta-conclusions that form “core beliefs,”
which are fixed, global and over generalized convictions about the self, others, the world
and the self in relation to external stimuli (Clark, 2009; Beck, et al., 2009). These
convictions have global consequences as a backdrop to psychiatric disorders.
CT postulates that many difficulties associated with psychopathology, including
depression, anxiety and psychosis, can be traced to cognitive distortions. It is
commonplace to accept the beliefs of those who suffer with anxiety, depression or other
psychiatric disorders as meaningful within the context of anxious or depressive thought
processes and therefore crucial to the recovery process. Distorted or maladaptive thought
patterns are examined and challenged in cognitive-behavioral therapy as a way of helping
sufferers to redress these pathological ways of thinking. The distorted thought processes
are believed to influence behavioral and feeling, thereby comprising the constellation of
pathological symptoms.
In the case of psychotic symptoms, particularly delusions, hallucinations and
disordered thought, however, it is commonplace to place the content and process of these
phenomena outside human comprehension. Cognitive theorists believe that, on the
contrary, these symptoms are understandable within the same conceptual framework that
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we understand thought distortions in other clinical disorders and therefore workable or
responsive as a part of the treatment process (Beck, 2004). As one explanation of
cognitively oriented understandings of prodromal psychosis put it, “like all people, those
at risk of psychosis attempt to make sense of their experiences in the light of their earlier
development and the meaning they attach to events will influence symptoms, emotional
responses and behavior” (Bechdolf, 2005). In its most basic form, the cognitive model
posits that events stimulate “automatic thoughts” (based on schemas and loaded with
psychological meaning for individuals), which then trigger emotional and behavioral
responses (Beck, 1979, as cited in Beck et al., 2009).
The experience of prodromal or emerging psychotic symptoms, whether
attenuated, brief or intermittent, is subject to the ongoing interpretation, dependent on the
person’s pre-existent schema and the nature of the symptoms. Another significant
assumption of cognitive theory is the notion that there is a continuum from “normality” to
psychosis. Rather than postulate that psychosis is located outside the realm of typical
experience, cognitive theory asserts that experiences that have psychotic themes are much
more common and exist along a spectrum of severity. This also fits well within the
conceptualization of the prodrome, as it is often characterized by attenuated symptoms
that do not meet the criteria for frank psychosis in severity or conviction. The researchers
who developed and train other clinicians in the SIPS/SOPS diagnostic measures state,
“one of the key determinants of a symptom being considered attenuated and not at a fully
psychotic level of intensity is the lack of conviction regarding the externally generated,
“real” nature of the symptom as well as the maintenance of insight” (Miller et al., 2003).
Therefore we can see that, for example suspicion is a relatively common experience, a
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person in the prodromal state may say, “I am fairly sure they watch me everyday”, a
person with psychosis states, “I know they are watching me everyday.” The degree to
which a person locates their experience of distress in externalized sources is a main
component of differentially diagnosing the prodrome versus frank psychosis. Such a
phenomenon is known as “externalizing bias” in CT and is discussed ore below.
In schizophrenia, an individual’s fundamental orientation is a reflection of their
distorted internal representations, according to cognitive theory. These representations, in
the case of psychotic illness, often predate the full expression of psychosis and thought
disorder. For instance, a person who has a cognitive vulnerability to schizophrenia may
have a fundamental belief or orientation of “me against them,” which is a precursor to
and foundation for externalized delusions and hallucinations with persecutory themes.
Cognitive distortions are in and of themselves seen as a vulnerability marker for
schizophrenic illness. Many of the distorted ways of thinking become solidified and
permanent during the highly stressful time period of the prodrome. As Beck describes it,
these “representation makes patients vulnerable to experiencing non-psychotic reactions
such as suspiciousness, depression, and anxiety, and they provide the substrate for the
formation of delusions” (2009). Frequently, the dysfunctional thinking process whereby
these distorted representations are manifest occurs at a time where life situations
(rejection, isolation, major life change) are targets of a person’s cognitive vulnerabilities.
When thinking about the nature of prodromal symptoms, we know that often what
distinguishes the prodrome from frank psychosis is the severity, frequency and conviction
of a person’s suspicious, bizarre or delusional thinking. In fact, the ideas a person has at
the prodromal stage may be more open to reality checking. As an example, in the case of
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James, he believed that there was a possibility that George Bush was involved in 9/11,
but was not absolutely convinced of it and was certainly not driven to act on these beliefs
or ideas. This belief could have been probed and possibly tested against evidence to the
contrary. This would then allow James to learn the coping skill of reality testing intrusive
and disturbing thoughts, rather than continue to perseverate on the, potentially further
deepening the beliefs toward delusion.
Cognitive Theory of Delusions and Hallucinations
Many of the positive symptoms of psychosis are conceptualized within the
cognitive theoretical outline as reflections of biased thinking (Beck, 2004). Biases in
thinking are seen in the individual’s highly selective attention to their misinterpreted
experience. These experiences are highlighted and become “hypersalient” (Beck et al.,
2009) to the individual.
One of the most distinct differences between the prodrome and frank psychosis in
the cognitive model is the notion that core beliefs meet with experience in a way that is a
progressive continuum from maladaptive interpretations to psychotic experience. The
paranoid beliefs run from “soft”, or open to influence, in the prodrome to “hard,” or
fixed, in frank psychosis. Each symptom typically arises from distinct sensory domains,
but all stem from the fundamental core schema underlying an individual’s proclivity to
particular biases. One such bias is an “externalizing bias,” which refers to the tendency of
cognitively at-risk individuals to believe that other people are dangerous or contemptuous
of them. These individuals are not able to acknowledge that these interpretations arise
from their own cognitive sensitivities and orientation, rather than from external sources
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(Beck, 2004). This externalizing bias leads those at risk to have the sense that the input
they are detecting has come from an external source, rather than from their own thoughts.
Individuals at risk also tend to have an egocentric bias, referring to thinking in
psychosis where irrelevant events are attributed to have personal meaning (Beck, 2004).
This is especially salient given that this referential thinking is often solidified during the
course of the prodrome by a process that could be deemed a “self-fulfilling prophesy.”
An individual at risk for psychosis holds core beliefs that his environment is hostile and
that he is at the center of this hostility. These foundational thoughts form a basis for the
individual to over-attend to experiences that are perceived as hostile. The individual
becomes hyperattentive as a way of managing the feelings of vulnerability and fear of
danger associated with this perceived hostility. Any perceived threat is then collected as
“evidence” of this hostility aimed at the individual, feeding the belief that the individual
is the center of his environment. This cycle continues, forming the “self-fulfilling
prophesy” as described above.
Cognitive Theory of Negative Symptoms
Similar to cognitive conceptions of positive symptoms, cognitive theory posits
that many individuals predisposed to psychotic illness have latent and inherent cognitive
vulnerabilities that lend well to the development of hallmark negative symptoms. While
positive symptoms have been seen has the defining features of schizophrenia and
psychosis, negative symptoms like alogia, paucity of speech, thought blocking, social
withdrawal and avolition have often been given less attention, especially within the
medical model, as negative symptoms are less likely to respond to psychopharmacology
(Beck et al., 2009). These symptoms, however, are important features of schizophrenia
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and have been since the time of Kraepelin and Bleuler. Beck et al. explain that prominent
negative symptoms, which are quite obvious in many patients with schizophrenia, mark
the absence of healthy behavioral and internal responses to stimuli (2009). They further
explicate that reduced verbal and nonverbal expression and lack of engagement in
constructive, pleasurable or social activities are outward reflections of internal working
models, likely established because of neurocognitive impairment. These factors lead to
emotional and behavioral deficits. Dysfunctional and negative belief schemas further
exacerbate distorted thought processes, creating expectations that are negative or
maladaptive. Research has shown that people suffering from schizophrenic illness are
especially prone to having expectations of self-defeat, poor performance, and social
ineptness (Beck et al., 2009). These beliefs, according to cognitive theorists and
practitioners, feed into social aversion, avoidance, apathy and social withdrawal,
independent of levels of depression, anxiety, positive symptoms, and disordered thought
(Beck et al., 2009). This entire process summarizes the presentation of negative psychotic
symptoms.
Research on Cognitively-Oriented Treatments
Dysfunctional cognitive functioning is not considered sufficient or even necessary
to cause a psychiatric disorder. Rather, cognitive theorists insist on the confluence of
biological, genetic, social, developmental, emotional and psychological factors in
explaining psychopathology broadly, schizophrenia and its prodrome more precisely. The
following is a review of the literature and research describing cognitive aspects of the
prodrome.
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Extensive research has been done in identifying cognitive vulnerabilities in
putatively prodromal individuals. One study administered a comprehensive
neurocognitive battery and clinical assessment on 37 participants who met Criteria for
Prodromal States (COPS) and compared the data to 47 healthy subjects and 59 first
episode of psychosis individuals. The results revealed that high-risk individuals
performed more poorly compared to the healthy control group, but better than the firstepisode group (Keefe et al., 2006). Several studies have essentially replicated this design
and found similar results, that at-risk individuals performed between healthy controls and
first-episode subjects on neurocognitive tests (Eastvold, 2007; McGlashan et al., 2010).
The researchers also discovered that the high-risk subjects struggled with processing
speed and measures of vigilance, memory and attention, among many other global
measures of cognitive proficiency.These studies help to corroborate evidence that
neurocognitive deficits are indeed present during the prodromal phase and deteriorate
further after the first episode of frank psychosis.
A double-blind study randomly assigned putatively prodromal individuals (using
SOPS criteria) to take olanzapine or to the control placebo group. Neuropsychological
tests were administered to each group and were repeated at 6 months and 12 months. The
results showed that neruocognitive deficits were present in each group and that
olanzapine had no effect on these deficits, also suggesting that cognitive vulnerability is a
pre-morbid state in individuals at risk for developing psychosis (Hawkins et al., 2008).
Once again, this asserts that cognitive vulnerability does indeed pre-date the onset of
psychosis and is perhaps not responsive to antipsychotic medication, thereby implying
the need for more psychologically based cognitive treatment approaches.
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As biopsychosocial perspectives on schizophrenia have become more pervasive,
alternative treatment modalities to antipsychotic medication have been explored. While
the primary treatment of choice for psychosis remains psychotropic medication, the limits
of these drugs have been recognized. Side effects of both first and second-generation
antipsychotics have been well documented and many patients must balance out the risks
of using such drugs with the short and long-term benefits (Nelson & Yung, 2008). It is
also well-documented that outcomes for patients with schizophrenia are much worse in
developed nations, where higher doses of antipsychotic medication is the norm, than in
the third world, where patients with schizophrenia are not given antipsychotic drugs in
such high doses, frequency and duration (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003). Further, a great
majority of patients who are prescribed antipsychotic medication and take them as
directed continue to have residual refractory symptoms that do not respond to
psychopharmacology (Serruya & Grant, 2009) The need for supportive housing,
vocational support, case management, family support, crisis intervention and general
clinical support, including supportive counseling has long been accepted as the gold
standard of treatment for psychotic illness, particularly in chronic and severe cases. These
approaches have also been transferred generally to prodromal populations (Nelson &
Barnaby, 2008). The genesis of more psychologically oriented treatment interventions
has primarily focused on either supportive psychotherapy or cognitively oriented
psychotherapy. Nelson and Yung openly recognize the need for more research on the use
of psychopharmacological treatment in the Ultra-High-Risk population (2008).
Research is limited on medication treatment in the prodrome, side effects can be
serious and long term treatment with such antipsychotic medication is not ideal,
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especially for patients who are not yet fully psychotic. However, the narrowing of
predictive diagnostic measures seems to introduce the imperative to look for other safer
treatment models.
Beck made early hypotheses in 1979 about the malleability of psychotic
delusional thinking, postulating that schizophrenic delusions were indeed open to reality
testing and were therefore representative of inherent cognitive misinterpretation (Beck,
1979 as cited in Beck et al., 2009). This paved the way for specific cognitive treatments
of schizophrenia, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis.
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp) is a modified version of
CBT that has broadly influenced treatment of schizophrenia. CBT is a very popular
treatment in general at this time, given the motivation for evidence-based treatment
modalities that work on specific symptoms that can be measured pre- and post-treatment.
CBT has been applied to many different symptom clusters in schizophrenia: anxiety,
reality testing, negative symptoms like social withdrawal and avolition, positive
symptoms like delusions and hallucinations, depressive symptoms and symptoms of
thought disorder. CBT has also been applied in group settings, as well as directed
individual psychotherapy. For these reasons, it is difficult to summarize the totality of
CBT’s impact in treating psychosis, as comparison across the literature is thwarted
because of different measurement use, milieu, and target symptoms.
One study showed that after thirteen sessions of group CBT, there was a
significant reduction in the delusional conviction and distress related to the delusion
(Landa et al., 2006). Tarrier et al. conducted a randomized control study and 18-month
follow-up with acutely psychotic patients measuring positive symptoms, time between
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relapse and re-hospitalization that showed that there was a significant benefit to CBT
versus treatment as usual, as measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS) instrument (2004). The results of this study also supported significant
improvement in the intensity and frequency of hallucinations with the use of CBT.
According to a randomized controlled trial conducted at the PACE clinic that
compared cognitive therapy with treatment as usual in 58 patients at ultra high risk of
developing a first episode of psychosis, UHR patients tolerated CBT, which appeared to
be efficacious in preventing conversion to psychosis. Participants were screened using the
PANSS instrument, which considers subclinical symptoms or brief psychotic symptoms
(Morrison et al., 2004). Therapy was provided over 6 months, and all patients were
monitored on a monthly basis for 12 months. The CBT group was significantly less likely
to develop frank psychosis over the twelve-month period. Positive symptoms, if present,
were also significantly reduced (Morrison, 2004)
Cognitive-Behavioral Paradigm
Cognitive therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy are collaborative, problemsolving oriented, and educational interventions that are time-limited and involve
structured and directed sessions with the client and therapist (Morrison, 2008). The client
is assessed based on the presenting disorder and homework is given that targets specific
symptomotalogy (Morrison, 2008). In the CBT paradigm, automatic thoughts are
addressed by examining the relationship between the event, thoughts, feelings and
behaviors.
CBT for psychosis has been shown, as stated above, to be effective in treating
many difficulties due to psychotic symtoms. The efficacy of these treatment methods,
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cognitive theory’s relatively easy applicability to the prodrome and the seemingly safe
and gentle effects of CBT have led many researchers to approach the prodrome from a
cognitive-behavioral treatment standpoint. While CBT may be an appropriate theoretical
lens for the prodrome, studies have not been altogether conclusive of its effectiveness in
treating specific symptoms of the prodrome, including attenuated positive symptoms and
over all social and role functioning adjustment. For instance, in one study, supportive
counseling treatment and CBT were compared in efficacy for increasing social
adjustment scores in subjects at high risk. Interestingly, both treatments were effective
and there was no significant difference between the CBT and supportive counseling
(Bechdolf, 2007). However, in a frequently cited study by Morrison et al. in the United
Kingdom, cognitive therapy significantly reduced the likelihood of making progression to
psychosis as defined on the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale over 12 months and
also significantly improved positive symptoms over the course of the research (Morrison,
2004). This study measured different aspects of the prodrome, because it was measured
by a different instrument (the PANNS), rather than the COPS/SOPS measures.
There remains a lot of interest and research on the application of CBT and
cognitively oriented treatments to the prodromal phase. There may in fact be evidence to
suggest that CBT is appropriate for certain individuals with certain prodromal
symptomatology, while CBT could be inappropriate, less effective or triggering to some
prodromal patients (Grazebrooke, 2004). Below, I will explore the case of James as an
example of cognitive case conceptualization.
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Application to Case Material
The case of James is a complex and at times perplexing case. When looked at
from a biopsychosocial model, specifically within a cognitive theoretical, many variables
must be considered. Firstly, it would be important to tease out the symptom picture more
fully. James presents with what appear to be depressive symptoms- avolition, anhedonia,
and loss of interest in previous activities. Some of these characteristics could also be
classified as neurovegetative and also include sleep-wake reversal and difficulty
concentrating (in school). Also of note, James has isolated himself from his family and
friends, he has a notable decline in school functioning, ultimately leading to school
refusal. His self-care has diminished. He shows signs of unusual thought contentincluding violent and nihilistic thoughts. He has had some suspicion (i.e. people looking
at him menacingly), grandiosity (becoming a rap star) and perceptual abnormalities
(hearing his name in the wind). The presence of these symptoms is certainly subpsychotic. Likely, if evaluated with the SIPS/SOPS semi-structured interview, James
would meet criteria for the prodromal state, especially if his mother’s episode is
considered as a family history of psychosis, placing him in the genetic risk plus recent
decline in functioning group (GRD). However, his attenuated positive symptoms are also
of interest, along with his cognitive decline- specifically his inability to complete
unstructured tasks, difficulty with memory and confusion. He is also experiencing
perceptual abnormalities that fall below clinical symptomology, but that include hearing
his voice in the wind and having the vague sense of déjà vu. As will be explored from a
cognitive perspective, the connection between James’ core beliefs about himself and the
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world and how he interprets his experience would play a significant role in the
attributions he makes about these difficulties.
James has a history of clumsiness, awkwardness and social difficulties, all of
which are vague in nature. He has a history of “inattention without hyperactivity”,
indicating the possibility of early cognitive deficiencies, which have been shown to
frequently proceed prodromal onset. While the case cites a family history of psychosis,
upon closer inspection, this episode does not appear to meet criteria for a full-blown
frank psychotic episode. Firstly, his mother reports a distinct misunderstanding between
her experience and what the treatment providers understood to be happening. Mother
reported that she heard the voice of her uncle, recently deceased at the time, whose name
happened to be Jimmy Carter. James’ mother reports she was hearing the voice of this
uncle, which was interpreted as psychotic hallucinations, but may have been a culturally
appropriate response to the death of a loved family member. As we do not have much
background from the case material, other than a brief passing mention that James is “a
young black man”, it would have been helpful for the interviewing clinician to inquire
about James’ background, cultural beliefs and values. This may have then provided the
information necessary to better understand his mother’s experience of audio
hallucinations. For instance, in many cultures around the world, it is not unusual for
surviving family members to have audio or visual hallucinations or visions of dead
family members (Whaley & Hall, 2009). In the case material, we hear James’ mother
clarify that there was confusion about the nature of her audio hallucinations, namely that
her dead relative shared a name with a past president. Since psychotic hallucinations and
delusions often contain ideas of reference or bizarre references to figures in authority, it
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would be cause for suspicion if she had claimed to be hearing President Jimmy Carter’s
voice. However, this was not the case, rather, it was her uncle Jimmy Carter she was
hearing. Because there are culturally sanctioned experiences that mimic psychosis, it
would be vital to understanding James’ family history to look further into the cultural
relevance of psychotic-like experiences. As I explore more in depth in the next chapter,
psychotic-like experience is not as rare as many people believe it is.
Cognitive theory has many interesting implications, given the potential for
prodromal psychosis within the case material presented above. Beck et al. indicate that
cognitive abnormalities predate the onset of psychotic symptoms in many patients who
go on to develop schizophrenia. These cognitive insufficiencies or vulnerabilities can
have a significant impact on an individual’s functioning in social and academic settings.
These vulnerabilities, along with other biopsychosocial sensitivities, meet with stress and
can set up conditions that are prime for the development of psychosis. Neurocognitive
difficulties, along with socialization problems and psychological problems contribute to
lowered motivation and interfere with young people’s ability to develop appropriate skills
for managing social situations (Beck et al., 2009). This can frequently reiterate or support
any fundamental core beliefs the person may have in their schematic understanding,
particularly beliefs about other people being dangerous, a “me vs. them” schema. Quite
typically, “these individuals either voluntarily withdraw from social interactions or
experience social isolation from others” (Beck, 2009). This is evident in James’ extreme
social withdrawal starting after his trip to South Carolina in the summer.
Beck et al. note that dysfunctional cognitive schemas are crucial in the onset of
hallucinations and delusions, as discussed above relative to frank psychosis. These
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maladaptive beliefs are often the result of stressful conditions or experiences that lead to
conclusions like “I’m inferior” or “People are against me” (Beck et al., 2009). These core
beliefs, as revealed in automatic thoughts, are the result of life experiences. In the case of
James, he has come to the belief that people in his neighborhood are dangerous and are
looking at him strangely. While few articles have discussed the significant of
sociocultural variables in the development of cognitive schema or prodromal psychosis,
these factors have likely loomed large and probably largely unconsciously in the life of
this young man. As a Black adolescent male in an urban setting, he may actually be
experiencing racial microaggressions in his community and perceiving them as personal
attacks. Given that he grew up in this community, this stress would have been enduring
and insidious. Now that he has sought help from highly privileged psychiatrists, who are
indeed white (given that we know who the authors of the article are). His suspicion, a
natural reaction under racially tense circumstances in which one is simultaneously
perceived as and perceives a threat, has become embedded as an internalized cognitive
structure. James’ sense that George Bush might have had something to do with 9/11,
which referential and perhaps paranoid in nature, was actually a relatively widespread
idea in New York after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade towers, another example
of a “symptom” that may seem to be evidence of paranoia out of context. Many people
living in New York shared similar beliefs, as many “conspiracy theories” were swirling
around the frightening terrorist attacks on American soil. However, given the other
surrounding difficulties James is experiencing, it would make sense to explore this belief
or notion further within the context of cognitive psychotic vulnerability.
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There is evidence from the case material that suggests that James had cognitive
and social vulnerabilities from a young age. This could have led to internalized
representations of the world, his sense of self and other people that were maladaptive. For
instance, if he struggled with social interactions and spontaneous skills in interpersonal
relationships (such as with schoolmates), this may have contributed to an internal
cognitive structure that led him to conclude that he was different and others were not easy
to relate to. When his schoolmates perhaps teased him or did not readily associate with
him, as is suggested by the report that his teachers perceived him as vulnerable and tried
to protect him, this may have reinforced the burgeoning schematic structure. This
underlying cognitive vulnerability impacted his ability to modulate stressful situations as
they arose and as his development proceeded through adolescence.
James is exhibiting signs that he has externalized his core beliefs of himself as
perhaps powerless and inferior, as evidence by his sense that people in his neighborhood
are viewing him as menacing and his community is dangerous. He also has a sense that
he might be able to prove himself by becoming a famous rap star and passing God’s
message of peace and love. Beck et al. hypothesize in their cognitive conception of
psychosis that often times an inflated sense of one’s own power, as is observed in
grandiose thoughts and delusions, is indicative of a core view of the self as inadequate
and others as superior. This is then defended against by portraying oneself as much more
important and others has inferior. James also has notions of blowing up the earth by
planting a bomb at the center of the planet. This thought or cognition displays not only
grandiosity, but also magical thinking, which is also reflective of a similar core schema of
feeling powerless (Beck et al., 2009).
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Based on the cognitive interpretation above, James’ impaired intellectual or
cognitive functioning from an early age has made him quite prone to the fundamental
attribution error, causing him to automatically attribute many life experiences,
particularly thoughts, to external causes (Beck et al., 2009). These attributional errors are
often concerned with threat in high-risk individuals, who often accumulate evidence that
supports their sense of externalization. While he does not state openly what he attributes
his difficulties to, it is clear from the ensuing interview that he has concerns about threats
outside of himself.
In cognitive theory, the prodrome is marked by the collision of vulnerability
factors with stressors in the person’s life experience. The schemas that make up core
negative or maladaptive belief representations become “hypersalient” (Beck et al., 2009)
and go unchecked by healthy reality testing processes. If continued without intervention,
automatic thoughts and hypersalient beliefs can become more solidified by emotional and
behavioral reactions to these disturbing thoughts in the form of social aversion and
emotional withdrawal. As these beliefs move from “soft” to “hard” through the process of
attributing internal processes to externalized entities, subclinical symptoms may become
more crystallized and prominent. For these reasons, motivation to identify and treat the
prodrome is high, particularly for individuals like James, whose family history of
psychosis is unclear and whose functioning has significantly declined.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DIALOGIC THEORY
The second theoretical perspective that will be explored and applied to the clinical
phenomena of prodromal schizophrenia is the postmodern perspective, specifically
dialogic theory and the Open Dialogue Approach. This chapter will outline the
fundamental principles of the broad contextual stance of postmodern theory, then will
apply the postmodern stance generally to schizophrenia and the prodrome. I will then
explore in depth dialogism and the Open Dialogue Approach. Dialogism and Open
Dialogue will be applied to the case of James and will be used to understand the
prodrome to schizophrenia from a postmodern lens.
Postmodernism: A Response to Modernism
It is important to understand the larger context of postmodern theory as it applies
to mental health and illness before delving deeper into one specific theory from within
this framework. In this section, I will broadly explore postmodernist theory as it applies
to psychiatric illness concepts. It will be first necessary to explore the notion of
modernism, to which postmodernism is a response.
Postmodernism, as it were, is a sweeping term referring to a philosophical or
paradigmatic shift in how we view ourselves and the world. The postmodernist paradigm
arose in response to the modernist paradigm that had dominated our worldview since the
time of the Enlightenment. The focus that characterized the Enlightenment period of the
18th Century was on truth by way of reason. Modernist or Enlightenment thinkers were
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responding to the medieval paradigm, which was dominated by superstition, fear, and
dogmatic religious belief. The notion that humans were superior among all living beings
inhabiting the earth became paramount during the Enlightenment. According to this
philosophical perspective, what set humans apart from other beings was their ability to
reason and to objectively know truth. That an objectively knowable truth existed and this
truth was not ruled by superstition, supernatural belief or religious faith led to a belief
that the world was “ordered according to the dictates of reason; a world shaped by
science, technology and the primacy of efficiency” (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). For this
reason, scientific inquiry became of primary significance, as modernism asserts that the
objective truth can only be ascertained by rigorous and scientific methods, such as
medicine and research.
Psychiatry and much of the mental health field has been dominated by a highly
modernist approach. In fact, the biopsychosocial perspective is indeed a modernist
framework, albeit a broadly encompassing and less reductionist one. The
biospsychosocial perspective seeks to identify and understand the causes, courses and
treatments for human suffering, taking into consideration a confluence of various factors.
The very pursuit of valid and reliable measures for diagnosing individuals with mental
disorders is an entirely modernist agenda. Effective treatments imply cause and effect,
reflecting an objective state of human wellbeing and thereby knowable categories of
illness. Therefore, our typical conceptions of diagnosis, such as the DSM-IV (and other
diagnostic manuals), and treatment, such as Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, are examples
of modernist practices based on modernist theories. Modernist theories are also often
referred to as the positivist position. Positivism refers to the approach to knowledge as
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objectively, positively identified sensory experience, which is considered the preferred
way of knowing. This position is explored more in depth below.
In this section, I will explain the broad context for postmodern theory and use
Foucault’s philosophy to ground the theory. Postmodern thinking is not an outright
rejection of modernism, but involves bringing awareness to its limitations. One theorist
that has exemplified a postmodern response to modernism is Michel Foucault. The
application of a postmodern paradigm to mental health and mental illness is well captured
by Foucault, who was a dominant postmodernist dissenter to our traditional conceptions
of psychiatry, mental illness, mental health and psychology. While the preceding terms,
including psychiatry and psychology, are by no means synonymous, nor do they
encapsulate the entirety of the modernist enterprise, the terms will be used as entre to
more a grounded grasp the postmodern critique of modernism. The following paragraph
will outline Foucault’s influential critique of the modern position in mental health.
Foucault is particularly critical of psychiatry and psychology’s claims to
objectively knowable categories of illness of the mind. He records a history of how
madness became known to be an illness and then a specific mental illness. As he states in
Mental Illness and Psychology (1976), “it was only the arrival of the calm, objective,
scientific gaze of modern medicine that what had previously been regarded as
supernatural perversion was seen as the deterioration of nature” (p. 65). Foucault
identifies the “calm, objective gaze” as one of modern society’s preeminent social
controls and believes that this gaze is present in clinics, hospitals, and prisons among
other professional settings. According to modernists, there is an objective notion of what
man’s “nature” should be and this is the standard by which all beings are measured. The
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scientific gaze is used to judge and categorize abnormality in relation to these “natural”
categories of normality. When the gaze falls upon “atypical” or disturbing behavior,
thoughts or ways of relating, individuals exhibiting these attributes are given labels
describing their deviation from the norm. Foucault also calls to attention the way that we
are invested in the “dividing up of social space according to the lines of valuation and
exclusion” (1976). Each culture has a different configuration of this divide and this shifts
over time. The practices each society implements to define the life of the “madman”
indicate that culture’s comfort with the deviation from “nature.” I would be remiss to not
mention that Foucault’s postmodern approach to mental illness if often critiqued for its
somewhat romanticized vision of mental illness; that illness is defined from outside of the
individual by professionals as a way of social control. This approach does indeed appear
to neglect the very real subjective pain of people suffering from mental anguish. This is
one reason that postmodern writers have begun to give such attention to subjective
experiences of those suffering from such anguish, which is discussed below.
Diagnosing madness, or more precisely mental illnesses, then is a project of
modernity. This project has to do with describing what constitutes “abnormality.” Many
postmodern thinkers have critiqued this project as inherently flawed. They criticize that
rather than identifying why and what exactly defines and causes abnormality, modern
psychiatry locates the problem within the person. In other words, defining mental illness
is about defending conceptualizations of normality. The postmodern critique maintains
that categories of deviation from this notion of normality are not pre-existing forms of
nature, but rather are constantly redefined in relation to social values. Each diagnosis is a
social construction that we honor based on our system of values. Our system of values is
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expressed in what Foucault calls “discourse,” which is a how language expresses formal
discussion, usually referring to social boundaries (1976). The discourse in relation to
psychiatric illness and suffering (and subsequent treatment) is subject to what Foucault
calls the “clinical discourse.” Foucault and many other social theorists believe that
madness or deviant human behavior has moved towards medicalization as a method of
social control. This in turn has a dramatic effect on individuals’ behavior and experience.
Many social theorists posit that discourses are extremely important because the do impact
peoples’ real lived experience. The available theories of knowledge and current discourse
act like blueprints for experience. For example, a person having unusual perception or
sensory experiences may feel quite distressed, not only by the actual experiences
themselves, but also by what the person knows might be signs of “becoming crazy,”
based on the prevailing discourse on what “crazy” means.
Critique of Positivism
In this section, I will further explicate the modernist perspective of positivism in
relation to postmodern critiques of this position. Positivism, part of the philosophical
foundation of modern psychiatry, is a position that claims that our objective observable
sensory experience is the only valid source of knowledge about reality (Nelson et al.,
2007). Positivism claims that operational definitions describe objects in terms of the
“specific processes or tests used to determine its presence of quantity” (Nelson et al.,
2007). For instance, in psychiatric diagnosis, this process is reflected in the descriptive
categories of symptoms, which are collected and organized by professionals, but
understood to be descriptions of already existent natural categories. A simpler example is
the notion of measuring an object’s length, whereby the tool for measurement must be
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objectively tested and publicly agreed upon. Such is also the case with measures for
diagnosing clinical entities, including the prodrome to psychosis; the measures must be
tested and agreed upon by the psychiatric community. While most researchers and
clinicians acknowledge the constructive aspects of their diagnostic tools, as evidenced by
the constant redefinition of diagnostic assessment tools, modern psychiatry generally
claims to be in pursuit of fully defining phenomena that exist clinically; ultimately
moving closer to objective truth.
Postmodernism in general objects to the aforementioned approach, given that it is
indeed replete with presuppositions, theoretical biases and assumptions that allow
psychiatry to make claims to objective knowledge. Instead of coming closer to
objectively knowable truth, positivism only serves to privilege one set of beliefs over
other beliefs, often known as narratives. The notion of narratives is grounded in
postmodernism and refers to the idea that rather than the existence of a singular truth that
must be ascertained through scientific rigor, human experience is actually much more
multidimensional. The story of biological psychiatry and the medical model of mental
illness is merely one way of explaining or understanding schizophrenia or psychosis as
part of human experience. When we give preference to this modernist perspective, we
tend to silence or ignore other ways of conceptualizing these phenomena. This is
especially evident in the neglect of individuals’ subjective experiences of schizophrenia
or psychosis, which are almost always missing in research, diagnosis and treatment of
such disorders. A researcher’s position in examining schizophrenia often speaks to his or
her underlying assumptions about the nature of the illness and subjects diagnosed with
schizophrenia. It is often stated that individuals with schizophrenia lack insight into their

70

illness. This could partly explain the general avoidance of subjective interviews or
surveys of patients’ psychotic experience. Researchers’ positions regarding schizophrenia
are often colored by the theoretical presuppositions inherent in their understanding of the
clinical phenomena. Subjective experiences of individuals experiencing mental illness
will be examined more at length below.
Critique of Modernist Concept of Schizophrenia
In examining the diagnostic category that has subsumed experiences called
schizophrenia, postmodern theorists are critical of many assumptions that precede these
categorizations. Taking up the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, as it is seen as a
guidebook for practitioners, researchers and diagnosticians, and has become inextricably
linked with our understanding of mental illness, Irene Harvey indicates that this manual
only serves to describe categories or symptoms (referring to DSM III-R; 1987).
Describing categories of illness is a task that does not benefit most patients, as it does not
probe precipitating factors or causation. It is also fraught with assumptions about
normality. For instance, Harvey illuminates one aspect of diagnostics in schizophreniathe absurd nature of delusions. Referring to utter lack of grounding in reality, “absurdity”
is not diagnosed or defined in the DSM, rather it is simply pre-understood. In other
words, any “healthy” individual would be well aware and grounded in reality enough to
recognize absurdity when confronted with such (1987). Further, the DSM III includes
symptom check-lists for the presence of such phenomena as “content of thought,” which
in schizophrenia so defined can include “overvalued ideas” and “markedly illogical
thinking” (i.e. clear internal contradictions or clearly erroneous conclusions). What is
overvalued or markedly illogical is once again based on a subjective assumptive position,
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a position of “normality,” which “has its history just as madness does, and it is a result of
a product, not a pure natural origin that might fall into madness- or, in this case
schizophrenia (Harvey, 1987). Harvey also criticizes the manual’s writers’ foregone
conclusion that speech is the best way to know thought content and therefore mental state
(1987). She argues that relying on spoken language to ascertain an individual’s mental
state is also an act of assumption.
Further, the arbiter of defining the assumption we come to call “normal” is almost
always a person in a position of power; a clinician, doctor, judge, prison guard,
researcher, etcetera. The application of the clinical gaze is a way of sorting out the social
categories of normal and abnormal. As Kovel puts it, psychiatry’s effort towards raising
mental disorders to the conceptual level of disease gives a certain “grandeur” (1987) to
diagnosis of mental anguish or suffering. Disease, in modernist theory, is a pure, real
thing- in-itself (Kovel, 1987) that can be objectively known, studied, quantified. While
there are widely variant, highly technical and specific critiques by myriad postmodern
thinkers, the preceding examples are provided as a jumping off point for the general
flavor of postmodern theoretical approaches. In fact, as Bracken and Thomas (2005)
state, “postmodern thought represents a struggle to free ourselves from the idea that there
is only one path to the truth, one way of using reason, one form that science and serious
reflection should take” (p. 95). There are many postmodern theories, thus ongoing
critique of positivist or modernist psychiatry could be made ad nauseum. Postmodernism
can broadly be seen as a perspective that does not privilege any single method, paradigm,
or authority but rather seeks to hold a multiplicity of possible truths in response to the
single narrative of scientific modernism claim to truth.
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Subjective Narratives
One way to move from the broad theoretical base and to dig more fully into the
phenomena of schizophrenia and its prodrome is to explore subjective narratives of
individuals with these experiences. In order to more deeply understand the postmodern
position on schizophrenic experience and its prodrome, I will use phenomenological and
narrative approaches to explore and ground the fate and lived experience of these
individuals. By way of including marginalized narratives, many postmodern critics have
sought to provide a space for the voices of those diagnosed with schizophrenia, those
experiencing their first psychotic episode and those at risk. In the section below, I will
discuss and explore how phenomenology uses first-person narratives not to explain the
etiology of psychosis and psychotic risk, but as a descriptive practice that is intended to
bring out essential features or characteristics of schizophrenic experience.
In this paragraph, I will look at the notion of the self as it emerges from narratives
of those having from psychotic experiences. Phenomenological critiques of modern
psychiatry have described the subjective experiences of people suffering from
experiences labeled psychosis or schizophrenia, as discussed above. The relevance of
subjective experience is crucial from a postmodern perspective, given that the experience
of psychosis is so alienating, isolating, unbearably frightening and difficult to describe
(Seikkula, 2003). Further, these individuals are experiencing a crisis or disturbance of
their fundamental sense of self (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008; Nelson et al., 2007). While
notions of the “self” vary among theorists, part of the postmodern and phenomenological
pursuit is to give voice through language and discourse to previously silenced voices.
Expressions of psychotic disturbance and the close examination of subjective experience
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shed light on the distortion of the self and subjectivity in psychotic disorder, but do not
define the self objectively. This is especially the case in ultra-high-risk cases, where the
onset of symptoms may be signaling a serious disturbance of the self and a crisis of
meaning-making. Sass states that the descent into psychosis leads to the loss of an
individual’s sense of active intentionality and integrated sense of self (1999).
Phenomenology of Schizophrenia and the Self
Nelson et al. explore the subjective dimensions of individuals at risk for psychosis,
stating, “what brings a patient to the psychiatrist is a disturbance in their experience of
self, others and world, not a complaint about abnormal activity of neurotransmitters”
(2007). Nelson and colleagues discuss descriptions of anomalous subjective events in
ultra-high risk individuals. These descriptions of unusual subjective events include
anomalies of self-identity, awareness, affect, perception, etcetera (2007). The lack of
these descriptions in the literature have been foregone in preference for reliable and valid
measures, which Nelson et al. critique. The existing criteria for diagnosing Ultra High
Risk (UHR) patients does not include subjective experience, which includes anomalies of
affect, cognition, perception and body-motor experience (2007). In an in-depth study of
self-disturbance in psychosis conducted in Denmark, analysis of the data revealed that
self-disturbance is highly specific to schizophrenic illness. This research group also
discovered that pre-schizophrenic prodromes were marked by the significance of selfdisturbance. Marked self-disturbance, as measured by the Examination of Anomalous
Self- Experience instrument (EASE), was strongly indicative of the development of a
schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Parnas et al., 2005; Parnas & Handest, 2003). From
this research, we can conclude that a disturbance of self-experience or sense of self is a
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fundamental hallmark of schizophrenic illness, more so that in any other
psychopathology, and that this disturbance predates the onset of full-blown psychosis.
Therefore, the significance of subjective experience of the self is of paramount concern in
understanding the prodrome.
The exclusion of subjective experience of an individual’s altered sense of self in
psychosis has long been problematic for postmodern thinkers. In this section, I will
discuss some of the ways that self-disturbance can occur in psychosis and the prodrome
and outline how these have been generally excluded from the literature. As Sass outlines,
many schizophrenic patients lose their sense of an integrated self and active intentionality
(1999). As described in the phenomenon chapter, many patients experience their thoughts
and experiences as coming from an external entity, as being controlled or powerless.
Simultaneously, it is not unusual for patients to also have the sense as the self as allpowerful and all-knowing. The self seems to be “dispersed outwards, where it fragments
into parts that float among the things of the world: even one’s most intimate thoughts and
inclinations may appear to emanate from some external source or mysterious foreign
soul” (Sass, 1999). At the same time, the self may seem to have pre-eminent power to
influence events and others. Sass illuminates the duality of this experience as paradoxical
and incredibly mystifying, causing a chasm in the sense of self.
Sass invokes Foucault when discussing the resulting awareness or “hyperreflexivity” on one’s own consciousness becomes a preoccupation for the person (Sass,
1999 ). The tendency to be hyper-reflexive leads to intense self-consciousness and
alienation, in the form of turning inward and away from social life, practical activity and
emotion (Sass, 1999). This is done, as least in large part, in response to the objective gaze
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of psychiatry. This view of the schizophrenic condition moves away from modernist
notions of schizophrenia as a brain disorder, whereby the brain’s function in essentially in
decline. Madness is frequently associated with irrationality, idiosyncratic behavior,
disordered thought and incorrect or inferior functioning in general. Schizophrenia can
indeed display marked obscurity and contradiction, but this profound alienation, turning
inward and anomalous thought processes are not indicative of abnormality or of a
“broken brain” in this framework.
Medical and biological psychiatry has minimized our ability to hear the multiple
narratives of those suffering from these experiences and how the sense of self shifts in
these people. The move towards medicalization has often been coined “reductionism”,
which is the belief that many different events can be attributed to (or reduced down to)
one main type of knowledge, namely positivism (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). In
psychiatry, almost all aspects of human behavior, including aspects that have meaning,
can be reduced to, attributed to, or explained by “non-meaningful” causes (Bracken &
Thomas, 2005). For example, anxiety, worry, fears, hopes or loves can be attributed to
genes, neurotransmitters, atoms or neurons. While it is certainly admirable that
biopsychosocial approaches have broadened the scope of causal entities (genes and social
environment and ego functioning, for example), it is still a practice of categorizing in
relation to normality. As Nelson et al. discuss, the attenuated symptoms of the prodrome
do not place an individual at risk, rather, the underlying core of psychotic vulnerability
signals an increased risk (2007). This vulnerability is not describable, although
researchers have attempted to describe the phenomena of symptomology of risk, but
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instead the expression of subjective disturbance is the crux of understanding the
vulnerability to psychotic experience.
Postmodern Theory of Mental Illness, Schizophrenia and the Prodrome
What, then, are we to make of individuals suffering from what has come to be
called mental illness, specifically schizophrenia and its prodrome? If these are not
categorical illnesses with biological, psychological and social causes, triggers and
components, then how shall individuals so suffering be assisted when seeking help?
Postmodern theorists have indeed themselves been critiqued for speaking of philosophy
and theory of mind when human beings are dealing with real and unspeakable conflict,
suffering and pain due to the conditions or experiences that have been gathered under the
heading of schizophrenia. To add to the confusion, it does appear that researchers have
been successful in narrowing down the phenomena that signal the risk of developing such
a conflicted experience (and so named the prodrome to schizophrenia). If these are only
conceived as socially constructed categories, then are we not less compelled to intervene
and possibly prevent such suffering?
Ultimately, postmodern theory is a constructionist theory, proposing that indeed
our understandings of meaning are created in practice through interpretation and
discourse, not necessarily expressions of a priori natural conditions. This allows for
many, multiple meanings and truths to emerge, simultaneously. One of the primary
concerns in constructionist postmodern theory broadly is giving dominance or preference
to any one discourse over another (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). Modernist positivism’s
tendency to give primacy and preference to one narrative as truth is of particular concern,
as it ignores and marginalizes other narratives. In this case, the narrative of psychosis as a
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biological brain disorder with environmental influences is preferred to the more
marginalized narrative of psychosis as a profound alteration of self-experience with little
or no known etiolgy. These critiques are helpful in understanding the way that we have
come to define and treat major mental illnesses like schizophrenia. The critiques allow us
to conceptualize these experiences as phenomena that often arise in personal and familial
crises and that these crises represent the individuals’ attempt to make meaning out of
their experience. However, many postmodern or social construction approaches are
rebuffed for being impractical and lacking in actual perspectives from those with such
experiences. For this reason, the inclusion of subjective narratives from individuals
themselves suffering from psychotic experience is invaluable.
Giving space for exploring the sense of self as described by beings suffering from
psychotic experience is an endeavor that can help to bring these neglected narratives
forward and into the mainstream. Most diagnostic, treatment or etiological narratives
ignore the perceptions of the sufferer. Schizophrenia, psychosis and the onset of
symptoms interrupt “the lives of people struggling to find and create security and
meaning in a world of contingency” (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). Symptoms are yet
another contingency; a “threat to human well-being that must in interpreted and
constructively engaged” (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). Many clinicians and researchers
believe that people suffering from schizophrenia are doubly beset with difficulty because,
whether a function of the illness or the person’s capacity for reflection, they often lack
insight into their symptoms. However, such an assumption has in fact been reputed by
many first-person narratives in which it is revealed that a person’s suffering is in fact
exacerbated by her all-too acute self-awareness of the losses, difficulty and
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disappointment she is experiencing as a result of her disorder (Davidson, 2003). Sass’s
concept of “hyper-reflexivity” also endorses this notion that rather than being utterly
unaware of their predicament, people suffering from psychosis are in fact much more
acutely aware of the difficulty they find themselves mired in.
Postmodern Approach to the Prodrome of Schizophrenia
From a social constructionist perspective, psychosis can be conceived of a
temporary, radical and alienating experience that isolates one from shared
communication. The person experiencing psychosis feels they are in a ‘no-man’s land’
where unbearable experience has no words, and therefore no voice and no authentic, real
agency in their lives (Seikkula, 2003). Lysacker and Lysacker are clear in pointing out
that individuals with psychosis do not completely lose their sense of self, nor do they
collapse entirely into self-referentiality (2008). This is apparent in their intersubjective
experiences of being occasionally overwhelmed by experiences with other people and
their own subjective experiences (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). For instance, an
individual experiencing psychosis may become distressed by an interaction with another
person that they perceive to be threatening, in turn causing paranoia or frightening
thoughts about the person’s intentions. They also may have subjective experiences that
can be distressing as well, indicating that the self is maintained and is subject to
experiences that are interpreted and perceivable.
Davidson conducted interviews with over one hundred individuals in different
stages of schizophrenia or psychosis (2003). Those who were able to describe the very
first hint of the onset of the illness described the experience in varying ways. Some
experienced the presence of classical “positive” symptoms, namely hearing voices,
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although this often started off in subtle forms, such as whispering or vague noises. Others
experienced subtler changes before any hallucinations were present. However, Davidson
concludes that nearly all the participants experienced “cognitive changes,” such as
memory loss and confusion, concentration problems and loss of interest or ability to
focus on things that used to interest them. They also reported increases in sensitivity to
everyday phenomena. This sensitivity along with changes in perception, cognition, and
attention gave participants an overwhelming sense of being distracted (2003). This
further led to social withdrawal and isolation. Participants attempting to makes sense of
these experiences of themselves were left so confused that they often lost their own sense
of agency (Davidson, 2003). This process served to externalize the distressing
phenomena of the disorder, but also continued to alienate the person from their own sense
of agency and self (Davidson, 2003; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). When a person feels
she is not in control of her own thoughts (many say hallucinations seem to come and go
as they please), experiences of the self can feel less integrated.
One possible way that delusions develop in this model is that the sense of one’s
own agency being usurped by an illness or disorder of unknown origins leaves a vacuum
or space to be filled with some other, usually demonized and externalized being. The lack
of personal agency is then explained by the usurping of this control by this other agent.
Examples of such external agents vary from each individual; God, the devil, the police,
the government, an unfriendly neighbor (Davidson, 2003). Lysacker and Lysacker further
explicate that many reports of those having complex verbal hallucinations
overwhelmingly have the sense that these “voices” cannot be responded to or engaged
with (2008), once again contributing to a sense of “voicelessness.” Intrapersonal dialogue
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is interrupted incessantly by anomalous sensory or misperceived mental phenomena,
further disabling the person’s foundational process of self as dialogical. Hallucinations
are essentially monologues (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).
Many voices of first person narratives examine retrospectively the earliest signs
of the struggles associated with the illness. Many of these narratives include themes of
confusion and silence around the earliest onset of the illness. The earliest signs are often
troubling and distressing, but a solidified language is lacking in order to give voice to
these experiences. This silence and lack of language is incredibly alienating for the
individual who is already struggling with a crisis of meaning in an attempt to make sense
of what is happening. As the person’s dialogical processes are interrupted, their ability to
clearly conceptualize self-positions deteriorates. Without this clarity, it can become more
difficult for a person to coherently present the appropriate self-position in interpersonal
interactions. Further, as subclinical positive symptoms become more frequent and
intense, the person’s ongoing intrapersonal dialogue is increasingly overwhelmed by the
monologue of hallucinatory voices (Davidson, 2003).
Open Dialogue Approach to Psychiatric Crisis
The Open Dialogue Approach is one example of clinical work with firm roots in
postmodern theory. In this section I will discuss the history of the approach and its
fundamental principles. This approach can be broadly applied to any psychiatric crisis or
difficulty, but has been shown to be particularly helpful in working with families affected
by the first psychotic episode. The Open Dialogue Approach is an example of
postmodern theoretical approach applied to real clinical work. Philosophically, Open
Dialogue is grounded in narrative and phenomenological frameworks. Its ultimate goal is
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not to change, cure, diagnose or even educate people, but to provide a space where many
voices can be heard simultaneously speaking of the same problem.
Roots of the Open Dialogue Approach
The Open Dialogue (OD) approach has its clinical roots in Northern Finland,
where the local psychiatric hospital team noticed that recidivism was high and that
engagement levels were low in cases where a patient was experiencing psychiatric crisis,
often the first episode of psychotic symptoms. The clinical team there found that the
“linguistic turn” of postmodernism and social constructionism was especially applicable
to families in crisis, who often found themselves separated from the process of
“treatment” and then referred to other providers, bouncing in and out of hospitals and
acute crises. This seemingly unending process of alienation left the family more and more
confused. The team acknowledged the discontinuity of the traditional approach, which in
many ways reflected the families’ experience; treatment professionals were constantly in
flux, each with different professional diagnoses and interventions (Seikkula et al., 2003).
As the team members bounced in and out of the families’ lives, the families’ parallel
process built mounting confusion about what could be helpful and consistent. This
confusion, the team in Finland found, was related to the lack of language to describe the
family’s experience.
As dialogism is firmly rooted in postmodern thought, it posits that intrapersonal
and interpersonal dialogues are the core of self-experience. Open Dialogue approach,
specifically, also owes a debt to the broad context of the double-bind theorists and family
therapists who pioneered a communication based approach to understanding psychotic
problems (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003). A full review of the double-bind theory and a
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comprehensive history of family therapy’s contribution to understanding psychotic
problems are well beyond the scope of this thesis, but these two theoretical and practical
approaches are important to acknowledge. Double-bind theory asserts that psychotic
problems have their origin in relational context (typically families) and begin with
communication contexts where hallucinations and delusions are adaptive (Seikkula &
Olsen, 2003). According to double-bind theory, conflicting and complex communication
patterns within families can lead to the development of psychotic symptoms as a way of
coping. For example, a family member may tell the identified patient that he is loved and
valued, but may maintain a facial expression that communicates repulsion. Over time, the
conflicting verbal and/or non-verbal patterns of communication can lead the person to
respond with psychotic expressions, such as hallucinations and delusions, as a way of
coping (Bateson et al., 1963). Expanding from this theoretical model, many models of
family therapy attempted to untangle the paradoxes of communication and relational
interactions contributing to psychotic problems in one family member (Seikkula & Olsen,
2003). Open Dialogue approach, however, directly attempts to open double bind
interactions. In Open Dialogue, psychotic expressions are seen as adaptive ways of
coping with unbearable experiences. As we see in dialogism, often the person’s inability
to shift among self-positions and to maintain internal and external dialogue. Social
networks are no longer sources of dialogic shifting, but rather monologic or silenced
communications. Beyond just solely looking at communications, the Open Dialogue
approach to addressing double-bind interactions also examines the relationship context in
which these communications are held, specifically by including the social network.
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Theoretical principles of Open Dialogue
The theoretical principles of the Open Dialogue approach are “tolerance of
uncertainty,” “dialogism,” and “polyphony in social networks” (Seikkula & Olson, 2003).
Tolerance of uncertainty and dialogism are practices of language that allow many
different narratives and perspectives to emerge. Rather than implicating one theory,
diagnosis or treatment plan over another, this allows for open collective dialogue to
progress. “Immediate advice, rapid conclusions and traditional interventions make it less
likely that safety and trust will be established” (Seikkula & Olson, 2003). Safety and trust
are of paramount importance and great attunement is given to therapeutic trust and safety.
This often requires that treatment meetings are held on consecutive days for upwards of
ten to twelve days following the initial meeting or crisis.
Theoretically, dialogism evolved from Bakhtin’s conception that human beings
are polyphonic beings composed of distinct voices in dialogue with one another (Bakhtin,
1984). At times these voices can be complementary, contradictory and contrary
(Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). As with the phenomenological view, dialogism asserts that
one’s sense of self is observed in feelings, thoughts, behavior and beliefs which are not a
singular essential entity, but a multiplicity or ensemble of “selves” (Lysacker &
Lysacker, 2008). Thus, dialogism offers a theory of the self as a complex, interactive
collection of parts that are in constant dialogue with each other and thereby can be in
contradiction or seeming disconnection with other parts. According to this postmodern
position of dialogism, the self can be conceived as an ensemble of “self-positions” that
are not organized or controlled by any overarching entity or “ego.”
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In this theoretical position, both the self and the world of experience are
conceived in parallel ways as collections of multiple narratives and positions. During
schizophrenic overwhelm, both the sense of self and the narrative of an individual’s
experience becomes disrupted. The experience of the self and its many positions is
distorted by the compromise in dialogism. The ability of the individual to maintain a
relational narrative with those in his or her network is also disrupted, leading to a deeply
isolating and alienating experience. When the individual’s dialogical relations with
significant others and those with whom they continually have contact with are disrupted
during psychotic experience, the individual’s capacity to experience himself as
autonomous and having agency and voice is impaired. Both the intrapersonal and
interpersonal experience of the self is diminished (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).
If the self arises as both a dialogue between multiple self-positions (intrapersonal)
and between the self and others (interpersonal), this is inherently a polyphonic and
dialogical continuum of experience. Many individuals suffering from the onset of
schizophrenia and ongoing psychosis have expressed that they experience diminishment
and fragmentation of dialogism and polyphony. It is hypothesized that organization of the
multiple selves or self-positions is impaired when schizophrenic disordering appears.
Practice Principles
The following are the seven main principles of the Open Dialogue Approach in practice:
Immediate help/intervention
Immediate intervention is a key concept in the OD approach. The clinician
receiving the first contact with the family arranges the first meeting within twenty- four
hours. Twenty-four hour crisis services are available in the Western Lapland and have
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been in existence since 1992. The team may meet many times during the initial crisis; the
team frequently anticipates meeting daily for ten to twelve days during the acute crisis
period (Seikkula, 2003).
Social-network perspective
Social networks refer to caring personal communities for support and
collaboration, reflecting the way people really live their lives in a postmodern society
(Seikkula et al., 2003). People’s subjective experiences are encompassed in their social
networks, not merely within a framework of symptomology in contrast to normality.
Families and networks are greatly impacted by the subjective psychotic experience of one
of their members. These social networks are made up of people from a clients’ personal
network, which can pose a challenge to traditional or conventional expertise of clinical
professionals. This challenge is precisely the move that OD intends, as the gaze of
professionals and the acts of identifying the problem within the family or network and
seeking to change the problem is one that is alienating and shows preference for the
metanarrative of the professionals. As Seikkula (2003) and his colleagues state,
opening doors for families to participate in analyzing the problem, preparing a
treatment plan, and participating in treatment meetings throughout the entire
treatment sequence were the first steps in seeing all the problems as problems in
the actual social situation of the patient (p. 190).
Flexibility and mobility
The treatment response is adapted to the needs and presenting concerns of the
family. For instance, treatment meetings may be scheduled at the family’s home, if
consented by the family (Seikkula et al., 2003). During a crisis phase or acute
presentation, no exact plans for future treatment are made by the clinicians, rather the
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team is focused on opening the dialogue with the family on a continuous basis. After the
crisis has calmed, treatment methods and interventions are chosen based on the family’s
values and input and on the patient’s problems, preconditions and needs (Seikkula, 2003).
Responsibility
The first staff member that receives contact regarding the referral, whether it is
with the patient, a family member or relative or another referring agency, is responsible
for scheduling the first team meeting. The entire treatment team takes charge and
participates in the whole treatment process (Seikkula, 2003; Seikkula et al., 2003).
Psychological continuity
The team of clinicians present at the first team meeting remains involved with the
case for the entire duration of treatment. This team takes responsibility for treatment as
long as necessary in both inpatient and outpatient settings. Members of the patient’s
social network are also invited to participate in every meeting. The team also anticipates
that the treatment of an acute psychotic crisis can require between two and three years
and the team commits to this time period with the patient with his or her social network
(Seikkula, 2003).
Tolerance of uncertainty
One of the unique elements of the OD approach is the intentional avoidance of
hasty decisions, premature treatment choices and diagnoses. This is part of inviting a
sense of safety and security, which in turn allows for a dialogue to form. As a routine part
of each team meeting, participants discuss whether and when the next meeting will take
place. Tolerating uncertainty in diagnosis, treatment and interventions is an active
attitude of the therapists who attempt to engage with the family and network to form a
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joint process (Seikkula, 2003). This is a departure from many treatment team decisions in
inpatient or crisis interventions where the focus is on the professionals rapidly deciding
on a diagnosis and treatment plan, which is then presented to the patient and the family.
Dialogism
The principle of dialogism, which is discussed at length above, when put into
clinical practice maintains that the focus of the treatment team is to promote dialogue
with the family. Focusing on change in the patient or the family is of secondary concern.
The dialogic conversation is a forum where families and patients have the chance to
increase and voice their sense of agency. The primary focus is on allowing a new
understanding of the problem to be built by holding a dialogue in following the themes,
language and way of speaking that the family is used to (Seikkula, 2003).
Research on the Open Dialogue approach indicates that it greatly decreases the
need for long-term and repeated hospitalizations, as well as decreases the need for the use
of neuroleptic medication. In an initial study of first episode psychosis, the model was
shown to improve outcomes by reducing recidivism, use of medication and the incidence
of hospitalization (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003). In a two-year follow up study of the OD
approach in outpatient settings for first-episode psychosis in Northern Finland, the OD
group had few relapses, shorter hospital stays, few residual psychotic symptoms and few
cases of neuroleptic medication prescription (Seikkula et al., 2003). This study was not a
randomly assigned, double blind study, so there are methodological limitations. But
compared to treatment as usual, better outcomes were noted and the Finnish program
continues to be employed as a first-line approach to first episode psychosis. The model is
also being used in acute care settings in much of Scandinavia and Russia (Seikkula &
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Olsen, 2003). The studies done in Finland have samples that are quite small and
homogenous, which the researchers concede is a limitation. Seikkula notes that while the
sample size and makeup are limitations, the strength of this systemic shift in the Western
Lapland region of Northern Finland has been a comprehensive, flexible and responsive
mental health response to psychiatric crisis. Duration of untreated psychosis declined to
3.6 months (Seikkula, 2003).
Application to the Case of James
From a broad postmodern perspective, it is helpful to conceptualize the case as
James’ narrative. Immediately, we find ourselves in the predicament that the story is
written in the third person past tense. Furthermore, the narrative is recorded by a clinical
researcher, who is attempting to distill James’ experience into a diagnostic framework for
the purpose of educating other researchers and clinicians. She asks James questions and
takes his history from his mother. This serves to distance the reader from the subjective
narrative and also diminishes our sense of James’ voice. If we were to only take what
first person statements James is recorded making, we would have almost no coherent
narrative at all.
Despite the flawed nature of the case’s recording, I will first take up the project of
the specific ways we are shown that James’ narrative is silenced and his sense of self
disrupted by his anomalous sensory and perceptual experiences. At first, we discover that
James initial difficulty appears to have begun over the summer when he was 15 years old.
However, we quickly learn, apparently from his mother, that he has always been
somewhat shy and awkward, although he was “an easier baby” than his brother. We find
that James was affectionate and loving. Also, we learn that James was assessed to have

89

difficulty with inattention, but this is vaguely described. Since we know from dialogical
and narrative theories that the self develops in dialogic relation to others and as a
narrative between the multiple self positions we occupy, we can assume that part of
James interpersonal dialogue between himself and others (mother, teachers, sibling)
would have included this sense that he was shy, awkward and inattentive. Therefore it is
likely that James developed the self-positions of self-as-shy, self-as-awkward, self-asinattentive. These self-positions likely interacted with other varying self-positions and
possibly contradicted his positions as self-as-loving, self-as-affectionate. Other possible
self-positions, which we do not have the privilege of exploring because we do not hear
directly from James regarding his sense of self, include, self-as-son-of-psychotic or selfas-different.
When describing his experience more recently, James states to the interviewer
that he perceives others to be looking at him as though he is “weird or menacing.” This
could signal James’ sense of himself as including these self positions of weird and
menacing, but could also be related to his self-position and identity as a black male in an
inner city. The very real experiences of people of color being marginalized in their
communities frequently occurs in subtle ways such as glances, looks, comments and
other microaggressions. In many cases, people of color experience “paranoia” that is
warranted, as they are the target of these microaggressions. Since people from the
dominant culture are seldom consciously aware of these microaggressions, the person of
color could be labeled as paranoid. To internalize this experience is to have an
intrapersonal dialogue that is quite disparate from one’s interpersonal dialogue, causing
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rifts in one’s self-position and clarity of one’s own capacity to choose and have agency
over sense of self.
James is also having anomalous sensory and perceptual experiences. These
profoundly frightening and alienating experiences have left him feeling diminished and
different from his peers. He acknowledged that he prefers to be by himself, feeling
uncomfortable around others. His sense of himself as different from his friends has led
him to the conclusion that they do not like him anymore. When he returns from South
Carolina to New York City, he states the city seems smellier, louder and dirtier than
before. James may be hypersensitive to sensory experiences as a result of his nascent
sense that he is different and becoming more disconnected with that which was familiar.
It is not likely that NYC is any different, but it could be part of James’ growing sense of
isolation and alienation- the city he grew up in and calls home is now even rejecting him,
while he feels disgusted by it. It may be especially evident that the city that he has lived
in his whole life is much dirtier, louder and smellier relative to his experience in South
Carolina.
James’ profound sense of isolation, alienation and confusion about his own
agency is vividly captured when he describes sitting alone and being found by a janitor,
unable to explain why he was there. This image of him, alone, silent and motionless is a
visual and experiential entryway into how James’ sense of self has been impaired by his
psychological, social and emotional experiences. The Open Dialogue approach would
point to this experience as the crux of a psychiatric emergency. The patient is having such
an utterly frightening and unbearably isolating event happen to them that they feel and
experience a very real loss of agency. We see this again captured in James’ difficulty in
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school; he cannot write an essay. He can barely get past the first sentence. In order to be
the author of a written work, one must have a sense of oneself as an agent with voice and
some narrative to tell. We see James’ ongoing sense that he has lost his voice and agency
in his own life symbolized by his near paralysis in attempting to author a written
narrative.
James attempts to make some sense of his frightening sensory events and his own
loss of power, voice and agency. He begins to react to this by withdrawing from settings
where interpersonal dialogue is necessary, such as school and with peer, social situations
and his family. He questions whether his friends even like him anymore. It is widely
know that stigma strongly impacts people’s perceptions of those with “mental illness”
and those suffering with these illnesses feel demoralized, as these stereotypes are
internalized (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).
Firstly, in a conventional modernist model of treatment or assessment, it may be
that James and his family would have to be on a waiting list in order to get into a clinic
for consultation. In most traditional medical models, after presenting for psychiatric
consultation, the clinicians involved would make diagnosing and assessment the
immediate goal. Many questions would be asked in order to illicit from James and his
mother whether James has symptoms that fit into any of the categories that these
clinicians diagnose and treat. These questions would often be specific and close-ended, as
the clinicians attempt to narrow James’ presenting concerns into categories; does he have
anxiety, depressive symptom, negative symptoms of psychosis, how strong are his
convictions about his perceptual and sensory experiences? Does James have cognitive
disabilities? During this process, James would be subjected to the calm, objective gaze of
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the assessing clinicians. Once a diagnosis was agreed upon by the clinicians, they would
present this to the family, along with treatment recommendations. Typically, first –line
treatment for any of the conditions in question in James’ case would include
psychoeducation for James and his family, psychotherapy, likely from a cognitive
behavioral framework and medication to address anxiety symptoms, depressive
symptoms and psychotic symptoms.
In contrast, using dialogical theory as the framework would understand James’
predicament in terms of dialogical compromises leading to experiences of selfdiminishment (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). In Open Dialogue, one of the ways to
understand and redress these compromises is to provide a structured yet safe space for
dialogue to re-emerge and to mend interpersonal dialogism. This is initiated by providing
immediate help in the form of the first team meeting. The patient and his family do not
get put on a waiting list, rather the initial meeting is schedule as soon after the first
contact is made as possible. Further, the patient’s social network is invited to this and
every meeting thereafter. In the instance of James, his mother, brother, teachers, friends
and any other relatives or people involved in his life would be asked to attend. During the
first meeting, the clinicians would invoke a sense of safety by establishing that meetings
will be held as frequently as necessary during the initial emergency. The focus of the
team meetings is not to rapidly diagnose and treat, but rather to establish rapport and
dialogue with the family. This is done by listening to the family and using their own
language to communicate about the problem as they see it. Each family member is
invited to speak about his or her sense of the problem.
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James’ social network would also experience the clinical team’s tolerance of
uncertainty. Rather than jumping to conclusions and making assessments and presenting
them to the family and patient, the clinicians become fully immersed in the task of
developing dialogue with the network. While uncertainty can indeed cause anxiety when
safety is of concern or when family members are highly distressed, this is often assuaged
by meeting every day until the initial crisis calms. This can greatly increase the networks’
sense that they are being heard and the patient’s sense that he is not alone. Allowing for a
polyphony of voices can be comforting to the patient, as it increases the likelihood of
dialogue and invites agency on the part of the patient. Further, since the polyphony takes
place in a safe environment and within the patient’s own network, it is much less
disturbing that the “caucophony” that many patients with psychosis abhor and become
overwhelmed by (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).
As the OD approach is network and language based, it is also need-adapted
(Seikkula & Olsen, 2003), which means that James’ need within the context of his social
network would be constantly and flexibly addressed. Therefore, all of the dialogical
aspects are met in this model; the need for voice, agency, response to a person’s changing
sense of self and needs and the interpersonal context that a person’s sense of self
develops.
The Open Dialogue approach can strike us as unusual or unstructured because it
does not seem to imply a systematic treatment intervention. However, the team meetings
serve as the ongoing treatment. The treatment principles outlined above continue to guide
the team’s approach with the family. This does not bar members of the team or the social
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network from requesting or implementing other treatment methods, including the use of
psychotropic medication and individual therapy.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I will begin by grounding the discussion of the two theoretical
perspectives relative to the prodrome in each theory’s concept of humanity and selfexperience. I will then discuss the core components of automatic thoughts, core beliefs
and cognitive distortions from cognitive theory as they apply to the prodrome. Next, I
will discuss the components of dialogical process, sense of self and loss of agency/voice
from postmodern dialogical theory applied to the prodrome. I will provide an in depth
discussion of the contrasting elements of the two theoretical approaches to the prodrome,
and will then move into the ways the two theories can be taken together to give us a new
understanding of the phenomenon of the prodrome.
Cognitive Theoretical Concept of Self-Experience
Cognitive theory begins with the assumption that human beings’ primary function
is to process information (Beck, 2009). Information is processed by making internal
representations of sensory experience of both external and internal events. Humans make
mental representations of all of their experiences. Accordingly, when formulating
responses to their experiences, people do not respond directly to the actual experience,
rather they respond to their mental representation of it (Clark, 2009). Human beings are
constantly involved and engaged in a perception-interpretation process. The result of this
process is affective, behavioral and physiological responses, which can either be positive
and adaptive, or negative and maladaptive (Clark, 2009). Thus, human beings experience
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themselves as well adapted and as coping well when their information processing is
unencumbered by cognitive distortions and maladaptive beliefs.
If we begin with this position on self-experience, according to cognitive theory, it
then follows that healthy humans process information with efficiency and functionality
allowing them to progress without undue distress or suffering in relation to their mental
representations. As can be the case when examining the essence of humanity in the
context of psychopathology, we often understand what health is in comparison to disease.
In cognitive theory, psychological disease or pathology is related almost ubiquitously to
disturbances to the information processing system for an individual. Psychological
disturbances can be characterized by excessive or deficient stimulation of the systems
responsible for beliefs or attitudes (Clark, 2009).
The cognitive model of the prodrome asserts that the core symptoms are derived
from basic disturbances in information processing causing vulnerable individuals to slip
into decline that is difficult to halt. These disturbances lead to perceptual abnormalities
and disturbances of the experience of the self (Nelson & Yung, 2008). These perceptions
lead to interpretations that have consequences in the ways individuals behave and feel.
Cognitively oriented interventions are aimed at redressing and restructuring the
information processing system. Overly maladaptive or negative perception-interpretation
processes are examined and ultimately challenged in favor of more positive or adaptive
ones.
Schemas and Cognitive Distortions
The foundational components of cognitive structures are called schemas. Schemas
are pervasive internal representations of stimuli, ideas, and sensory experiences that
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organize, filter and integrate information so that a person can find meaning in phenomena
(Clark, 2009). Schemas are essentially the cognitive bridge between perception of an
event and the interpretation of the event. Schemas are activated by any life event,
regardless of its origin (pathological or otherwise). When a person’s foundational
schemas are maladaptive or negative, information processing is biased from the outset.
This results in cognitive distortions.
Beck and many cognitive theorists believe that a great deal of psychopathology is
based on cognitive distortions. Distortions of thought are based on erroneous thinking
that is often derived from early learning experiences. These erroneous thought patterns
create long-term cognitive biases and inaccurate appraisals of both external and internal
stimuli, leading to the development of schemas. Schemas are long running patterns of
thought. Our interpretations of experiences are greatly influenced by our schemas
because schemas are unconscious foundational filters through which information is
processed. Part of cognitive-behavioral therapy is illuminating this process and
challenging beliefs that are maladaptive or unhelpful. In this capacity, cognitively
oriented therapy does involve giving language to previously unstated parts of human
experience, namely unconscious thought patterns, schemas and beliefs. Schematic
organization in prodromal individuals is thought to contain enduring representations of
the self, others and the world that are “negative.” This is the foundation for cognitive
vulnerability to prodromal syndromes.
Core Beliefs
Schematic orientations lead to core beliefs. An underlying schematic orientation
with tendencies towards externalization and views of the self as helpless or easily
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compromised lead to core beliefs such as “I am vulnerable” or “Others cannot be trusted”
(Morrison, 2008). Cognitive researchers maintain that core beliefs play a significant role
in the onset and escalation of psychotic symptoms. Negative beliefs about the self, the
world and others are associated with psychosis (Morrison, 2008). How a person appraises
psychotic phenomena tremendously impacts how the person responds to these
experiences. People appraise situations based on their schematic orientation. When an
individual interprets mental representations with core beliefs, they often come up with
thoughts to characterize the core belief. For example, if the prodromal experience is
subclinical audio hallucinations and the core belief is “others cannot be trusted,” the
thought associated may be “people at work are gossiping about me.” This thought can
lead to a feeling of paranoia, distress, anxiety, and anger, etcetera. It can also lead to
behavioral changes, such as social isolation. Delusional thinking in Ultra-High Risk
(UHR) individuals can be understood as an attempt to explain unusual internal
psychological states. As the person continues to have unusual internal experiences, they
continue to gather evidence aligned with the belief they have chosen to understand these
experiences.
In cognitively oriented treatment, core beliefs can be evaluated and changed
through cognitive-behavioral techniques such as gathering evidence for and against the
belief, generating a list of advantages and disadvantages to a particular belief, and
generating alternative beliefs (Morrison, 2008). It should also be mentioned that core
beliefs may not always be negative. For instance, many people whose schemas include
self-vulnerability and fear of others conclude that paranoia is a positive experience,
because it serves to keep them safe. Therefore, paranoia (i.e. “I must always be on
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guard”) as a core belief can be a positive reinforcing cognitive experience for some
(Morrison, 2008). Another example of positive psychotic-like experiences is social
withdrawal. Based on their core beliefs, many people are lead to paucity of speech, social
withdrawal and disengagement (Beck, 2004). The belief that disengaging with social
interaction (i.e. negative symptomatology) can assuage difficulty based distorted beliefs
about the self, others or the world. This can contribute to the cycle of information
processing and schizophrenic-like behavior and feeling patterns.
In prodromal syndromes, delusions are often not entirely or fully formed, hence
they are deemed subclinical, attenuated or brief. This makes sense within a cognitive
paradigm, given that a prodromal person can begin to have suspicions that are not
grounded in reality, but these thoughts or beliefs may not be entirely “hard.” This can
mean that the beliefs are open to reality testing or malleable. During the prodromal phase,
a process whereby individuals undergo psychosocial stress in combination with already
present cognitive vulnerabilities combine to cause symptoms that range from well below
psychotic level to brief periods of fully psychotic symptoms (Bebbington & Kuipers,
2008). Adverse experiences can combine with pre-existing core beliefs about the self,
the world and other people in the world to form delusional beliefs. As stated by
Bebbington & Kuipeers (2008), pre-existing vulnerabilities
triggered by stresses such as negative life events or negative relationships,
individuals may experience and increasing cascade of cognitive and perceptual
anomalies that, together with emotional reactions, lead them to conclude not that
this is a ‘bad day,’ but that external agents are conspiring against them. (p. 78)
Recovering from episodes of psychosocial stress activating cognitive schemas and core
beliefs that are prone towards externalizing of adverse events is highly dependent on the
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individuals’ capacities for cognitive coping. Often, in individuals who are prodromal,
such coping skills are absent. As we will see in the following section on automatic
thoughts, this is intertwined with an externalizing bias.
Automatic Thoughts
According to cognitive theory, automatic thoughts are the products of a biased
information-processing system (Clark, 2009). This information processing system rests
on the foundation of schema and core beliefs about the self and others. All experiences
and stimuli are filtered through these unconscious or rarely noticed cognitive structures.
The results are almost always automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts (or images) are
specific to current circumstances and are involuntary and temporary mental
representations of a person’s current affective state. These thoughts or images are
typically plausible or realistic in current circumstances, meaning that they are not
frequently so bizarre that they cannot be reconciled with the person’s current concerns
and schemas (Beck, 2009; Clark, 2009). However, in people who are cognitively
vulnerable, perceptions may be biased, which can in turn cause highly biased negative
automatic thoughts. Most often, an individual is not acutely aware of their automatic
thoughts. Automatic thoughts are usually a primary object of cognitive interventions.
Repeatedly illuminating automatic thoughts and their impact on behavioral, affective and
physiological responses is a way that cognitive therapists attempt to modify dysfunctional
underlying schemas and core beliefs (Clark, 2009).
Cognitive theory posits that hallucinations are in fact an externalized version of
the “inner voice” stream of thoughts that are present for most people (Beck et al., 2009).
In cognitive theory, thoughts are first person experiences (e.g. “I am a loser”). These

101

thoughts can translate into a voice, which is a second person representation of the thought
(e.g. “You are a loser”). Often in psychosis, these translated thoughts are heard as third
person accusations directed at the individual suffering from psychotic experience (Beck
et al., 2009). For those who are cognitively vulnerable to psychotic patterns of
experience, automatic thoughts play a very salient role in the development of prodromal
symptoms. Individuals prone to prodromal syndromes have cognitive structures such that
they perceive intrusive thoughts to be personally relevant and therefore requiring
response (Clark, 2009).
Beck et al. assert that the content of automatic thoughts play a significant role in
the exacerbation of hallucinations (2009). The process of the inner dialogue being
externalized into voices, hallucinations or delusions is related to a specific cognitive
vulnerability known as an externalizing bias (Beck et al., 2009; Clark, 2004). UHR
individuals are often prone to an externalizing bias. This externalizing bias leads those at
risk to have the sense that the input they are detecting has come from an external source,
rather than from their own thoughts or internal processes. It is typical of prodromal
individuals to have a pre-existing attributional style that tends to attribute negative
experiences to an external cause (Beck et al., 2009). This fundamental bias contributes to
the development of prodromal symptomatology, as many young adolescents have
negative automatic thoughts and psychotic-like experiences, but UHR individuals are
more prone to externalizing these thoughts (Beck et al., 2009).
Postmodern Theory’s Concept of Self-Experience
Postmodernist thought is, generally speaking, suspicious of what can be called
“meta-narratives.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, meta-narratives are theories or
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ways of knowing that make claims to truth above other ways of knowing. This is often
referred to as the linguistic or narrative “turn”, which refers to the paradigmatic shift in
the way we conceptualize our experience of the world, our selves and other beings. This
shift has at its root the idea that our lives and experiences cannot be distilled down to
biological, genetic, neurological, psychological or any other singular theory.
Based on the linguistic or narrative turn, dialogism honors that people are
comprised of multiple different parts all in continual dialogue with each other. Further,
the theory also brings to light that all forms of communication, spoken or unspoken, are
always a response to interpersonal and or intrapersonal interactions. The fundamental
conceptualization of human nature is the notion that each being occupies multiple selves
or self-positions that are in constant internal dialogue with each other. As Lysacker and
Lysacker, 2008, aptly describe, “we sense ourselves within and through encounters that
are at once intra- and interpersonal, and that reflect complementary and dissonant facets
of our being. [S]elf-positions are axes of self-world interaction, more a matter of who we
are, than of whom we take ourselves to be” (p.34). A continuous and ordered series of
shifts in our multiple self-positions relative to relationships, situations and experiences
reveals itself to us through the process of intra- and interpersonal dialogue. While this
process is a complex and dynamic interplay, it remains ordered as a response to worldly
interactions and coherent internal experience. The most basic concept of self-experience
is that people are in constant dialogue with others and within the individual his or herself.
An ordered and comprehensible process is necessary for the above to occur,
which of course presumes a person has the capacity for such order. While all humans,
according to dialogism, must engage in the dialogical process (both inter- and

103

intrapersonal), the theory also assumes that this process will be mostly unencumbered.
Dialogism does allow for dissonance, contradiction, confusion and complexity among
self-positions. However, the process of dialogue is still the crux of self-experience and
this must be a relatively uninterrupted and ordered process in order for a healthy sense of
oneself. This theoretical perspective, while much less apt to label interrupted dialogical
processes as “diseased” or “disordered” and to diagnose this as mental illness, still has at
its root a notion of health and order in self-experience.
Dialogical Process
Dialogism offers a theory of the self as a complex, interactive collection of parts
that are in constant dialogue with each other. Because human experience is a complex
multiplicity of many different experiences, the parts that make up a person can be in
contradiction or seeming disconnection with each other. According to the postmodern
position of dialogism, the self can be conceived as an ensemble of “self-positions” that
are not organized or controlled by any overarching entity or “ego” (Bahktin,1984;
Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). The self can be conceived as a continuous flux of selfpositions; for example, self-as-brother, self-as-African-American, self-as-anxious. Each
“part” of the self can be conceived of as a different self-position that constantly is in
intra-personal communication with other self-positions, depending on various life events
and interpersonal communications. The self-positions shift in relation to each other as
well. Every person’s self-positions flux in and out of prominence in the person’s overall
sense of himself. Further, a person’s multiple self-positions are in dialogue with each
other, which allows for even contradicting self-positions to co-exist (Lysacker &
Lysacker, 2008).
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Open Dialogue addresses the disruption of interpersonal and intrapersonal
dialogue by utilizing a language-based intervention for families with psychotic problems.
The person suffering from psychotic symptoms is invited to speak about their experiences
without judgment, hasty diagnoses or professional opinions. This is all accomplished
within the context of the person’s social network. The inclusion of the network serves to
address the disruption in the interpersonal dialogical process by bringing the individuals’
closest relationships into a communication-based setting and providing permission for
each person to conceptualize the nature of the problem in his own words.
Sense of Self
It is widely known that psychosis and schizophrenia changes how people think
about and experience themselves as individual human beings in the world (Davidson,
2003; Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). In
fact, even the earliest pioneers in schizophrenia research and literature, Eugen Bleuler
and Emil Kraeplin, acknowledged that a fundamental alteration of the self-experience
was a hallmark of schizophrenic experience (Lysacker et al., 2001). The changes in
process of making meaning, activities and processes that order the multiple selves face
diminishment during the prodrome. Changes in the processes that order the self were
cited as some of the primary difficulties in schizophrenia as early as the beginning of the
last century (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). The changes in these processes have largely
been ignored or conceptualized as secondary to biological and neurological disorder
within the biopsychosocial model.
There is evidence to suggest that the sense of self is diminished in a similar way
during the prodrome as it is during psychosis (Nelson et al., 2007). We also know that
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self-esteem is greatly impacted during most experiences with psychopathology and
negative experience of the self can contribute to ongoing difficulty in a number of
psychological problems (Beck, 2009). The collapse of coherent self-experience during
the prodrome may in fact signal the very first experience of sense of self being altered,
yet negative self-concept and an underlying sense of vulnerability may contribute to the
increasing sense of altered self (Nelson et al., 2007). From a narrative postmodern
perspective, this collapse of self-awareness or altered sense of one’s own self reflects an
impoverished self-narrative (Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010), which in
turn leads prodromal individuals to continue to experience themselves as diminished. The
self-narrative or self in dialogue with itself and others can be disrupted in potentially
three ways during the prodrome.
First, instead of experiencing the self as a coherent dialogue, ongoing
conversations within the self and others can be drowned out by one or two dominant and
loud self-positions of voices (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).
It is typical for a self-position to shift into dominance and for one to experience open and
continuous dialogues between separate and often opposing elements. These elements do
flow in a hierarchical fashion, the order and dominance of the self-positions routinely
shifting, allowing for the dialogue to consistently continue. During the prodrome, it is
indeed possible that the ordering and reordering of the hierarchy is disrupted in such a
way that internal dialogue is captured or dominated by one or two self-positions. It is
possible that the ever-shifting hierarchy ceases its shifting and becomes rigid (Lysacker
& Lysacker, 2002). This experience in the prodrome can be known as the monological
self, whereby the prodromal individual comes to only experience himself in one or two
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fixed self-positions. This self-experience can be correlated to those with significant
positive symptoms, whereby the “voices” of hallucinations and delusions are the
overriding and dominant self-positions.
The second possible disruption of self-experience in the prodrome is known as the
cacophonous self. This involves the break down of the hierarchy of self-positions in such
a way where no coherent dialogue can be perceived, leaving the prodromal to embrace a
cacophony of self-positions. The internal dialogue of the cacophonous self is rich with
voices and self-positions, however, they lack coherence, connection and hierarchy of any
kind, which in turn leads to inaccessibility of dialogue with others (Lysacker & Lysacker,
2002). This can also lead to anguish with the prodromal person, given that the self
appears to be dissolved into an incoherent, disorderly and unsettling collection of
unrelated self-positions. This self-experience could be associated with individuals who
have disorganized thought patterns, difficulty with concentration or decline in social
functioning.
Thirdly, an empty or “barren” sense of self could be capitulated if dialogue itself
became suspended. With only the bare minimum of self-positions available, the person
feels virtually useless to develop or continue intrapersonal or interpersonal dialogue. The
lack of or suspension of the self-narrative can lead to a prodromal individual’s sense that
they lack any capacity for dialogism at all. This could be associated with negative
symptoms, social withdrawal, avolition and anhedonia.
The sense of self or self-experienced is almost always altered or changed in some
way during the prodrome. Above, I have explored a few ways this might occur. Below I
will discuss the ways that these self-experiences relates to the clinical presentation of
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prodromal phenomena and how this relates to the cognitive understanding of the
prodrome.
Loss of Agency/Voice
Conceptually, psychosis and schizophrenic-like illness in dialogic theory is a
profoundly frightening experience during which a person loses her ability to describe the
experience and feels a distinct inability to act in response to this experience (Seikkula,
2003). As we know from dialogic theory, a person experiences themselves most fully
when he or she is able to engage in an ever-shifting internal dialogue between multiple
selves and external dialogue between other people and experiences in their world. During
psychosis, the person loses the ability to respond quite frequently within the context of
relational dialogues, both within social networks and internally (Bateson et al., 1963;
Seikkula, 2003). The self is experienced at its fullest when the capacity for dialogic
response is present. It has been theorized by some postmodern thinkers and Open
Dialogue researchers and practitioners that loss of the ability to respond is a primary
hallmark of the psychotic experience. As described above, the internal dialogue is
thwarted in any number of ways during the prodrome; by the barren, monological or
cacophonous self-experiences characteristic of the prodrome. One of the consequences
of the self-experience being diminished in the prodromal phase is that a prodromal
individual experiences a real loss of agency. Loss of agency can be characterized by a
loss of the capacity to act, speak and/or respond to the events and experiences of one’s
own life. In the prodromal phase this is often experienced as a loss of voice. The loss of
voice is characterized by the lack of everyday language to describe what is happening to
the person. As Seikkula et al. describe it, psychosis can be seen as “one way to deal with
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experiences so terrifying they can only be expressed though the language of
hallucinations and delusions” (p. 191). In many ways, hallucinatory and delusional
communications and utterances are a person’s active attempt to make sense of what is
happening to them. During the prodrome, these first frightening experiences are often
understated, intermittent or overshadowed by a decline in social functioning.
Nevertheless, changes occur during this period, most of which are outside of previous
experience and words.
The main task of the dialogue in OD is to construct a new language for the
difficult experiences of the patient and those in his or her network (Seikkula et al., 2003).
These experiences typically have not yet been given language or words that the patient
and the social network can use to make meaning and comprehend the incredible
frightening experiences occurring in the prodrome. OD is a language-based approach
(Seikkula & Olsen, 2003), which is a reflection of the crucial necessity of language in
order for prodromal to recapture a sense of agency. Within the dialogic framework,
rebuilding the capacity for voice and responsiveness to internal and external dialogue can
be the best way to address this aspect of the prodrome.
Contrasting principles: Critiques Using Dialogism and Cognitive Theories
When returning to the clinical phenomena of the prodrome based on the review of
the literature, it is crucial to realize that research has shifted over time. The prodrome is
conceived now to be a set of factors that signals increased risk for the onset of psychosis.
When these risk factors are present and an individual experiences stress or other events
that may cause psychotic symptoms in a more general population sample, prodromal
individuals are more likely to remain in a pervasive psychotic state. As discussed above,
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cognitive theorists often cite the fact that psychotic experiences are actually more
common than widely believed (Clark, 2009; Beck, 2004). Cognitive theory asserts, based
on the stress-diathesis model, that under circumstances that may cause severe stress,
underlying cognitive vulnerabilities will be triggered and maladaptive patterns will
emerge. This in fact fits nicely with the prodrome’s phenomena; that it can be a time of
attenuated symptoms, but more accurately reflects an underlying proclivity towards
pervasive psychotic patterns of thinking, acting, feeling and interacting. These patterns
emerge as subclinical symptoms, brief symptoms, social or functional decline in the
prodrome. Cognitively oriented therapy interventions have the goals of; 1) managing
existing symptoms, psychotic, depressive, anxiety and any other co-occurring
psychopathology, including substance abuse and 2) preventing the possible conversion
into frank psychosis (Auther et al.,2008; Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001).
We can conceive of the prodrome as both a clinical phenomenon unto itself and
yet inextricably connected to psychosis. The prodrome is a distinct clinical entity, as it is
a different set of symptoms and clinical presentations than frank psychosis of
schizophrenia. However, without definitions or common understandings of psychosis and
schizophrenic illness, it is impossible to conceive the prodrome as separate entirely from
these phenomena. The prodrome signals risk for psychosis and also shares features,
symptoms and patterns with psychosis. In general, prodromal research has been
dominated by the medical psychiatry and biopsychosocial models.
One critique that dialogic theory would have of cognitive theory would be in the
fundamental idea that a person’s thoughts can be “erroneous.” This notion implies the
modernist conception of “health versus disease” or “right versus wrong”; namely that

110

there is a healthy way to think or a right way to think and this is contrasted with
unhealthy or maladaptive ways of thinking. This is particularly poignant in examining the
long-term existent schemas of individuals who suffer from prodromal experiences. Many
of these experiences are profoundly disturbing and frightening; however, a person’s
premorbid functioning often plays a significant role in how they are able to cope with
such experiences (Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001). Cognitive theory offers that a
person’s distress in the face of psychotic symptoms and experience is real and often
exacerbated by their pre-existing schemas, thoughts, and self-references. Dialogism
would add that because these thoughts and schemas are automatic and rarely discussed in
everyday life, there is a lack of language with which to describe and relate to these
experiences. Describing and relating our experiences to others and to all of our multiple
self-positions is crucial in the dialogical process. It is also crucial to the dialogic principle
of polyphony and tolerance of uncertainty, in which labeling ways of being as
“maladaptive” would be seen as unhelpful, stigmatizing and disruptive of dialogic
processes. There is growing evidence the supports the idea that stigma and negative
expectations themselves are enough to contribute to worse outcomes in psychotic clients
and those attempting to recover from the first psychotic episode (Lysacker, Glynn,
Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010).
OD addresses the dialogical nature of human beings by utilizing a social network
perspective. The social network includes those who are nearest to the patient (Seikkula et
al., 2003). OD openly acknowledges that the self is a polyphony of self-positions and
voices from those in our social network. While tolerance of uncertainty and the social
network are believed to be highly helpful in developing a new language-based solution to
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the problem of prodromal psychosis, cognitive theory would critique this on the grounds
that OD does not go far enough to mend the foundational vulnerabilities that led to the
onset of the problem. For instance, redressing cognitive distortions and underlying
schema that led a person like James to believe that he was be glanced at menacingly by
folks in his neighborhood might include exploring his experience of internalized racism,
leading to feelings of vulnerability and fear. CBT would work with James to address the
underlying beliefs and choose beliefs that were more in line with healthier functioning.
As stated above, management of active symptoms during the prodrome would be crucial
in a cognitive paradigm.
In many cognitively oriented treatments, the clients’ explanatory model for their
own problems or difficulties is explored (Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001). In
cognitive therapy, this serves to build the therapeutic alliance and collaborative approach.
Beyond this, from a dialogic perspective, conceptualizing a person’s own internal
representation of the problem allows for the patient’s voice to be heard and to be truly
accepted as one possible explanation for ongoing difficulty. The ultimate goal of
cognitive therapy is to redress or challenge maladaptive core beliefs and cognitive
distortions (Clark, 2009). From a dialogic perspective, this can pose a problem, as it
directly challenges the principle of tolerating uncertainty. As we know from dialogism
and the Open Dialogue approach, diagnosing or coming to rapid clinical conclusions is
something that OD attempts to avoid. In CT, labeling one set of cognitions as
“maladaptive” and another “adaptive” and favoring the more adaptive set is an example
of striving for certainty. Diaologism would also critique the goal of redressing
“maladaptive” core beliefs and cognitions during the prodrome, as this task would be
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incredibly challenging when an altered internal dialogue and diminished sense of self are
present for the client. Further, such redressing or cognitive “restructuring” requires the
capacity to reflect on one’s own thinking and self-experience. This capacity, often known
as metacognition, is often greatly impaired during psychosis and in the presence of the
prodrome (Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010). CT does implore that
building engagement and the therapeutic alliance is crucial to providing safety in order to
challenge these beliefs. However, the very notion that one person has the authority or
power to privilege thoughts as more adaptive is problematic from a postmodern position.
Cognitive restructuring, utilized during cognitively oriented therapy, including Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy, is also problematic because it does not address the underlying
problems related to diminished capacity for meta-cognition and self-experience.
Commonalities Between Dialogism and Cognitive theory
Cognitive theory and dialogism have several commonalities, despite their
divergent origins. These commonalities include the fundamental understanding that
psychotic-like experience is more typical among the general population than commonly
asserted. Further, both theories assert that disturbance of the sense of self is a primary
feature of the prodromal phase. Neither theory attempts to fully explain the cause or
fundamental origin of psychosis or its prodrome, but rather explains the way psychoticlike experience comes about, can be adaptive, what vulnerabilities might be present in
prodromal individuals and the ways that these vulnerabilities are manifest in situations
ripe for psychosis.
Cognitive theory helps us to understand some of the core vulnerabilities
underlying the onset of the prodrome. In fact, cognitive theorists and dialogic theorists
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assert that psychotic-like or frankly psychotic experiences are more common among the
entire population than is generally acknowledged (Beck, 2004; Davidson, 2003;
Morrison, 2008). However, most people have these experiences only rarely or under
severe stress. Those vulnerable to psychosis or already in the prodromal phase have far
more devastating and prolonged experiences that often lead to frank psychosis or
schizophrenic illness (Beck, 2004) The cognitive structure in these individuals that is
prone to core beliefs about the self such as “different, inept, inferior” (Beck, 2004).
Dialogism furthers this conceptualization by acknowledging the different selfexperiences in the prodrome that correlate with these descriptions; monologic, barren or
cacophonous. Symptoms associated with the prodromal phase are not unlike more
common experiences, but only when these experiences become pervasive and intense,
causing distress, changes in behavior and cause some decrease in “insight” is a diagnosis
of psychosis made (Beck, 2004).
Both cognitive theory and dialogism cite disturbance of the sense of self as one of
the most significant experiential difficulties for prodromal individuals (Lysacker &
Lysacker, 2009; Nelson et al., 2007; Nelson & Yung, 2008;). As discussed earlier, there
are three potential ways that self-experience can be disrupted, altered or diminished in the
prodrome. These three ways include the barren, monologic and cacophonous selfexperiences. Dialogic theory does help us to conceive of many of the ways that selfexperience can be disrupted and how this manifests into prodromal presentations.
However, dialogism does not explain the exact mechanism by which self-positions,
dialogues and sense of self become hallucinations, delusions, negative symptoms and
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social decline. Cognitive theory can work within the dialogic framework to explain in
more detail how these self-experiences come about.
Frequently in cognitively oriented therapies, challenging distorted, maladaptive or
unhealthy cognitions is part of the symptom management process. If a person has core
beliefs that are negative or vulnerable, it is likely these beliefs are not verbalized and a
great deal of shame is experienced when these beliefs are brought to light through
behaviors or expression of language. During the process of cognitive behavioral therapy,
inductive and Socratic questioning is used in a collaborative and safe manner as a way of
peeling back the layers of information processing (Morrison, 2008). This is a way of
giving voice and language to a previously silenced part of a person’s life, which mirrors
the significance of a language-based intervention that is also relational and dialogic from
dialogism. It is also done within the safety and containment of a relational dyad or group.
One of the first principles of CBT in general and specifically for psychosis or firstepisode psychosis has been to establish therapeutic alliance (Jackson, McGorry, &
Edwards, 2001). This is also aligned with the dialogic idea of social network. In the
Open Dialogue approach, the patient is invited to include their social network in the team
meeting. The network can include family, friends, teachers, mentors and any other people
that are significant in the person’s life. This is done as a way of visibly bringing the
prodromal person’s interpersonal relationships to the forefront in order to address the
disruption in interpersonal dialogue. As we know from dialogism, providing opportunity
for interpersonal or external dialogue is a way of reawakening the person’s capacity for
intrapersonal or internal dialogue.
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One of the other most salient common factors in dialogic and cognitive theories is
that neither theory offers a comprehensive causal explanation for schizophrenia,
psychosis or the prodrome. Instead, the theories each help us to conceive of what is
occurring during psychotic or prodromal experiences. While cognitive theory is much
more rooted in a biopsychosocial perspective, it does offer a refreshing conceptualization
of psychotic symptoms. Instead of using the “diseased brain” explanatory model for
understanding so-called incomprehensible psychotic symptom content, cognitive theory
actually asserts that symptom content can be used to understand a person’s circumstances
and cognitive vulnerabilities. Dialogic theory, firmly rooted in postmodern theory, asserts
that psychotic symptoms are in fact a person’s attempt to make meaning out of intensely
disturbing and disparate internal experiences. Both theories allow that psychotic-like
experience is on the spectrum of reasonable expectable human responses under certain
circumstances. The prodrome, therefore, both separate from frank psychosis and yet
inexorably linked, also lies on this spectrum of experience.
Understanding the Phenomena in a New Way
In this section I will use components of both theories to provide a synthesis of
theoretical understanding. I will end the chapter with a re-assessment of the case material
utilizing the synthesized theoretical framework.
The dominance of one or two self-positions can be known as a monological self.
As we know, a dialogical self where continual dialogical process occurs inter- and intrapersonally. During the prodrome, the hierarchy of self-positions can become fixed in such
a way that one or two self-positions become dominant. The resultant difficulty in the
intrapersonal dialogical process is significant, as a prodromal person’s sense of self is
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significantly diminished without prior experience modeling how to return to a full
dialogical self. Above, I stated that this could be associated with positive symptoms and
emergent delusional thinking. A “monological” self, one dominated by one self-position
correlates to the cognitive model of the process by which a person’s “inner voice” is
externalized, creating auditory hallucinations (Beck, 2009). The inner voice of cognitive
theory is actually a multiplicity of voices in healthy individuals. In prodromal individuals,
a cognitive structure that favors externalizing adverse events and automatic thoughts that
are indicative of vulnerable schemas can lead to the dominance of one or two selfpositions. The self-positions are “louder” and can drown out the other self-positions. In
this way, self-positions are manifest from inner voices representative of a fixed dialogical
process. These one or two voices are externalized outside agents through the process of
automatic thought development. As we know, many prodromal individuals begin to
fixate on a few beliefs that have bizarre or delusional content. The above process can also
help to explain how the preseverative thought and belief system begins to form in the
prodrome.
Another possibility in the prodrome is that a caucophony of voices presents itself,
whereby an individual feels overwhelmed by a flood of self-positions with no apparent
organization (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). The lack of relationship between selfpositions signals a clear disruption of the intrapersonal dialogic, which leads to
disturbance in interpersonal dialogue and the coherent sense of self. This disorganized
presentation could manifest itself in loosening of associations, reports of voices or lack of
coherence in language, as is frequently seen in the prodrome either as subclinical
hallucinations and delusions, as well as disorganized thinking, difficulty in concentration

117

and social and functional decline. Cognitively, the prodromal person is unable to properly
process information as it enters the person’s perception.
Yet another presentation in prodromal individuals appears to be what most
clinicians would deem “negative” symptomatology. This is characterized by undeveloped
or fragmented self-positions. In this case, an individuals’ dialogue with others is likely to
be limited and discontinuous. James’ case is a good example of this kind of experience of
self-diminishment based on disrupted dialogical processes. In cognitive theory, the
“barren” or more silent presentation is in fact an active coping skill. The disengagement
in communication and social skills is a way of managing intensely disturbing affect
associated with such dialogue. We can conceive of the barren or empty self as correlated
to negative symptomatology. The cognitive conception of the negative symptoms of the
prodrome (i.e. social withdrawal, avoidance of social contact, avolition) are seen as active
coping skills used to assist the individual in mitigating the disturbing content of his
thoughts and the associated negative affect (Clark, 2009). The person also often searches
for evidence to support the beliefs she has chosen to explain her unusual internal
experiences. Rather than characterizing this as evidence of lack of insight, as is
traditionally done with refractory delusions, it is much more helpful to see this as the
person’s struggle for meaning.
Application to Case of James
The case of James reveals what could be called negative symptomatology and a
self-experience that appears to be barren or perhaps monological. When asked what
brings him in for an evaluation, James states that he doesn’t know why he is there, which
can lead us to assume that he has little awareness of the problems that have caused his
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social network to have concern for him. He has retreated from his friends and other social
activities, such as playing basketball. He shows little enjoyment or motivation in the
activities he once engaged in. He has also begun to refuse to attend school. When he was
attending school, he frequently lacked language to describe his thoughts, intentions,
experiences and emotions. His self-narrative seems to certainly be impoverished, as he is
unable to capture his experience in words. Rather, his inaction seems to speak louder than
anything he has said.
We cannot know what James’ subjective self-experience is, as we have limited
material from the case and his capacity for language seems to be disrupted. What little we
do know, however, points to a diminished sense of self. He feels uncomfortable around
others, unsure of himself and how to act. He gets the sense that people are looking at him
menacingly, he is not sure if he should make eye contact with others. He also has the
sense that he is having déjà vu with relative frequency. All of these experiences could
signal either a diminishment of available self-positions, as in barren sense of self, or the
dominance of one or two fixed self-positions, as in monological self-experience. For
example, James states that he finds New York dirtier and noisier after returning from
South Carolina. This may signal a difficulty in James’ ability to shift to and from the selfposition of self-as New Yorker to self-as visiting other places, for instance. He becomes
fixed that something is no longer the same in New York and has difficulty re-entering his
self-position in this context.
One of the characteristic images of the prodrome is captured in the case of James;
James sitting by himself, silent and unable to describe what is happening to him when he
is discovered by the janitor at his school. This occurs after James has isolated himself
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from his friends and family and lost interest in many of the activities he once enjoyed.
Even more striking, James is literally at a loss for words when asked to write an essay in
class. Upon hearing this passage, one is at once stuck by the silence and inability to act
that James is struggling with. Within this very imagery, we can find core components of
dialogic theory; the lack of language, interpersonal and intrapersonal dialogue, loss of
agency and diminished sense of himself.
From cognitive theory, we can see that James has perhaps an underlying
externalizing bias, as evidenced by his increased thoughts about politics, blaming George
Bush for 9/11 and fantasizing about violence, and feeling that society was controlled by
TV and mass media, all coinciding with his diminished self-experience and experience of
himself as different, uncomfortable and unable to act in appropriate ways. Many of his
thoughts are common and contextually quite typical as a black, teenage male living in
New York City. However, he appears to have a proclivity to locate his difficulties
outside of himself, which can lead to automatic thoughts that are externalized, negative
and indicate underlying schemata and core beliefs based on vulnerability towards
psychotic-like thinking.
Based on the research suggesting three prodromal syndromes, as stated in other
chapters in this thesis, James could meet the criteria for the prodrome. Based on the
Genetic Risk and Deterioration syndrome (GRD), (assuming that James’ mother’s
psychotic-like experience does indeed qualify for genetic risk), James does in fact show
significant signs of social and role functioning decline. It is also possible to argue that he
is experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms (hearing his name whispered, seeing the
dark shadow, feelings of paranoia, etcetera), which are captured by the Attenuated
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Positive Symptoms syndrome (APS). One of the challenges to using an objectified
instrument to account for prodromal risk is that, as in the case of James, the symptoms
are frequently difficult to categorized and objectify. There are several examples of this
within the case material: the questions of James’ mother’s “psychotic break” accounting
for genetic risk, cultural and race factors including James’ experience of paranoia as a
young black male in his neighborhood, and other vague but unusual perceptual and
sensory abnormalities.
Coupled with these underlying vulnerabilities and his limited sense of himself,
James is already exhibiting signs of negative or diminished self-experience. Given the
above criteria signaling a vague risk, evidence of a negative symptom picture and from
our new understanding of the prodrome based on both cognitive and dialogic theory, it is
certain that James is at high risk for psychotic experience. We know from this new
understanding that negative symptoms often indicate an active attempt to cope with an
altered sense of self. We can also extrapolate that James’ extreme withdrawal and lack of
language signals limited options for self-positions and a lack of language for describing
his experience. We know from his mental status exam that he was able to describe a
limited self-experience in the last few months. His initial reaction to why he was
evaluated, however, is indicative of severely limited language-based communications of
what is troubling him.
Limitations
There are certainly limitations to these theoretical conceptualizations. One
question that may arise is related to the notion that psychosis may arise as a result of
chemical imbalances in the brain or structural brain abnormalities. Both theories do allow
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for the possibility that brain dysfunction or abnormality could be the cause of psychosis
and its prodrome. Cognitive theory, for instance, would respond that the conflation of
biological, neurological, psychological and social factors combine to contribute to
vulnerability and onset of psychotic illness. This thesis has explored psychotic illness
that is not related to medical illness, substance abuse, or severe affective or mood
disorders. In the absence of these conditions, there are still aspects of psychotic illness
that appear to be left unexplained by cognitive theory. The theory rests on the principle
that human suffering related to psychopathology has psychological underpinnings related
to information processing. Many human experiences are outside the cognitive realm and
involve physiological and special sensations, affect, emotion and meaning making,
among many other things. Cognitive theory heavily rests on reflection on thinking,
cognition and intellectualization of human experience, which does preclude many other
ways of experiencing and understanding the world.
Cognitive theory allows for any number of conditions to interact and explain the
etiology of psychotic illness. This leaves us with innumerable factors combining in
causation of psychosis. While the significance of cognitive theory’s contribution is
notable in understanding how psychotic thinking can be understood and addressed, it still
leaves many unanswered questions about how to more narrowly conceptualize biological,
genetic, neurological and developmental causes.
Dialogism, on the other hand, makes no claims at definitive etiological theory of
prodromal syndromes. Postmodern theories, dialogism included, would state that
psychotic symptoms are not actually symptoms of an underlying disease, but rather are a
response to circumstances in which prodromal symptoms make sense. These “symptoms”
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are an indication of the prodromal person’s response to their altered sense of self.
However, we do not receive clear information about where self-disturbance originates
and how it comes about.
This thesis is limited to the two theoretical frameworks I have chosen to explore.
The choice of these theories and my way of exploring and synthesizing them reveals my
own theoretical and practical biases and is one way of conceptualizing the clinical
phenomena of the prodrome.
Treatment and Practice Implications
The primary goal of treatment would be to assist James in moving from the
collapse of internal and external dialogue towards improved capacity for such dialogue.
Because James appears to be suffering with barren self-dialogue, it can also appear that in
the diminishment of self-experience, self-positions have been lost of eliminated during
the prodromal period. It could be assumed that the mechanisms of distorted cognitions
and diminished dialogical processes means that cognitive ability and dialogical capacity
have been lost, but this is actually not the case. As we know from research on selfdisturbance and neurocognition, these vulnerabilities are often present in pre-morbid
period and often onset more fully during the prodrome. Cognitive and dialogical capacity
can be built during therapeutic interventions that include relational dialogue, promotion
of internal dialogue, awareness of the role of automatic thoughts and cognitive thoughts
in relapsing prodromal symptoms.
Psychotherapy is at its core a relational dialogue, involving an interpersonal
dialogue between the therapist and the client. If self-experience is disrupted in its
capacity for dialogue by the prodromal experiences, then providing access to increased
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dialogue is a viable foundation for beginning treatment. Access to latent self-positions
must also be addressed. There is evidence to suggest that initiating external interpersonal
dialogue can assist in re-establishing intrapersonal internal dialogue (Lysacker &
Lysacker, 2002). James’ limited available self-positions could be rebuilt with the support
of a therapist, with the therapist serving to assist in challenging automatic thoughts that
can limit James’ access. Tolerating uncertainty will be a crucial aspect of treatment,
which can be somewhat hard to reconcile with cognitive behavioral work. It will be
important for the therapist to not create a new self-narrative, new self-positions or initiate
self-experience for James, but rather to use the therapeutic alliance to identify agreed
upon cognitive distortions and automatic thoughts that are preventing the full range of
self-experience.
It is also important to include the social network in James’ treatment as a way of
continued interpersonal external dialogue. This will also make it possible for the family
to access language for what was previously difficult or impossible to describe. This can
serve as a model for James’ own internal dialogue. It can also serve to rebuild
interpersonal connections that represent existent but silenced self-positions, such as selfas-son, self-as-brother, self-as-part of family, self-as Black or African American, etcetera.
Returning to self-positions that have lain dormant can help to enrich the self-narrative
and lessen feelings of paranoia, discomfort and limited sense of self that accompany
negative externalized thoughts.
Conclusion
It is clear that the suffering and mental anguish experienced during the prodromal
phase of psychosis warrants clinical attention. From this current study, we can conclude
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that self-disturbance present during the prodromal phase and perhaps prior to the
prodrome is quite likely to be one of the defining features of psychotic illness. Both
cognitive theory and dialogic theory help us to see how underlying vulnerabilities
conflate to create a diminished self-experience for individuals at high risk for
schizophrenic illness. In turn, this disturbance of sense of self may be the crucial risk
factor or indicator of psychotic experience. The two theories allow us to see the
mechanism by which self-experience is altered in prodromal syndromes. This alteration
lays the groundwork for the entrenchment of psychotic illness. Cognitive theory and
dialogic theory, taken together, can offer many practical clinical interventions that
address the key disruptions that occur during the prodrome.

125

REFERENCES
American Psychological Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders: DSM-III-R (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association.
American Psychological Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders: DSM-IV-R (4th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychological
Association.
American Psychological Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders: DSM-IV-TR (text revision). Arlington, VA: American
Psychological Association.
Addington, J., Cadenhead, K. S., Cannon, T. D., McGlashan, T. H., Seidman, L. J.,
Walker, E. F., et al. (2007). North American prodrome longitudinal study: A
collaborative multisite approach to prodromal schizophrenia research. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 33(3), 665-674.
Addington, J. & Mancuso, E. (2009). Cognitive-behavioral therapy with
individuals at high risk of developing psychosis. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 65(8), 879--890.
Auther, A. M., Gillett, D. A., & Cornblatt, B. A. (2008). Expanding the boundaries of
early intervention for psychosis: Intervening during the prodrome. Psychiatric
Annals, 38(8), 528-537.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1984). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics [electronic resource]. (C.
Emerson, Ed.,Trans.). Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.

126

Bateson, G., Jackson, D., Haley, J., & Weakland, J. (1963). Toward a theory of
schizophrenia. Hoboken, NJ US: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Bebbington, P. & Kuipers, E. (2008). Psychosocial factors. In K.T. Mueser & D. V. Jeste
(Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 74-81). New York: The
Guilford Press.
Beck, A.T., Rector, N.A., Stolar, N., & Grant, P. (2009) Schizophrenia: Cognitive theory,
research, and therapy. New York: The Guilford Press.
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (2005). Postpsychiatry: Mental health in a postmodern world.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Bota, R. G., Sagduyu, K., Filin, E. E., Bota, D. A., & Munro, S. (2008). Toward a better
identification and treatment of schizophrenia prodrome. Bulletin of the Menninger
Clinic, 72(3), 210-227.
Bottlender, R., & Möller, H. (2003). The impact of the duration of untreated psychosis on
short-and long-term outcome in schizophrenia. Current Opinion in Psychiatry,
16(Suppl2), S39-S43. Retrieved July 15, 2009 from PsychoInfo.
Cannon, T. D., Cadenhead, K., Cornblatt, B., Woods, S. W., Addington, J., Walker, E., et
al. (2008). Prediction of psychosis in youth at high clinical risk: A multisite
longitudinal study in North America. Archives of General Psychiatry, 65(1), 28-37.
Castle, D.J. & Morgan, V. (2008). Epidemiology. In K.T. Mueser & D.V. Jeste
(Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 14-24). New York: The
Guilford Press.

127

Compton, M. T., Goulding, S. M., Broussard, B., & Trotman, H. (2008). Treatment delay
in the early course of schizophrenia and the duration of untreated psychosis.
Psychiatric Annals, 38(8), 504-511.
Corcoran, C. (2009). Won't leave his room: Clinical high risk for developing psychosis.
DSM-IV-TR casebook and treatment guide for child mental health (pp. 385401). Arlington, VA US: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. Retrieved from
PsycINFO database, January 15, 2010.
Corcoran, C., Davidson, L., Sills-Shahar, R., Nickou, C., Malaspina, D., Miller, T., et al.
(2003). A qualitative research study of the evolution of symptoms in individuals
identified as prodromal to psychosis. Psychiatric Quarterly, 74(4), 313.
Corcoran, C., Davidson, L., Sills-Shahar, R., Nickou, C., Malaspina, D., Miller, T., et al.
(2003). A qualitative research study of the evolution of symptoms in individuals
identified as prodromal to psychosis. Psychiatric Quarterly, 74(4), 313-332.
Cornblatt, B., Lencz, T., & Obuchowski, M. (2002). The schizophrenia prodrome:
Treatment and high-risk perspectives. Schizophrenia Research, 54(1), 177.
Cornblatt, B. A., Lencz, T., Smith, C. W., Auther, A. M., Lesser, M. L., Shah, M. R., et
al. (2007). Can antidepressants be used to treat the schizophrenia prodrome? Results
of a prospective, naturalistic treatment study of adolescents. Journal of Clinical
Psychiatry, 68(4), 546-557.

128

Davidson, L. (2003) Living outside mental illness: Qualitative studies of recovery in
schizophrenia. (Electronic Book). New York: New York University Press. Retrieved
March 15, 2010 from www.smith.edu/libraries.
Downar, J. & Kapur, S. (2008). Biological theories. In K.T. Mueser & D.V. Jeste
(Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 25-34). New York: The Guilford
Press.
Eastvold, A. D., Heaton, R. K., & Cadenhead, K. S. (2007). Neurocognitive deficits in
the (putative) prodrome and first episode of psychosis. Schizophrenia Research,
93(1), 266-277.
Ellman, L.M. & Cannon, T. D. Environmental pre- and perinatal influences in etiology.
In K.T. Mueser & D.V. Jeste (Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp.
25-34). New York: The Guilford Press.
Foucault, M. (1976). Mental illness and psychology. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Glatt, S. Genetics. In K.T. Mueser & Dilip V. Jeste (Eds.), Clinical handbook of
schizophrenia(pp. 55-64). New York: The Guilford Press.
Grazebrooke, K. A., Siddle, R., Leadley, K., Everitt, J., Benn, A., Haddock, G.,
Kinderman, P.K. & Tarrier, N. (2004). First episode psychosis: Two cases to
illustrate the role of cognitive behavioral therapy in making sense of unusual
experiences. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 32, 331-345.

129

Gottesman, I. I., & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (2001). Family and twin strategies as a head
start in defining prodomes and endophenotypes for hypothetical early-interventions
in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 51(1), 93-102.
Hafner, H. & an der Heiden, W. (2008). Course and outcome. In K.T. Mueser &
D.V. Jeste (Eds.), Clinical Handbook of Schizophrenia (pp. 100113). New York: The Guilford Press.
Haroun, N., Dunn, L., Haroun, A., & Cadenhead, K. S. (2006). Risk and protection in
prodromal schizophrenia: Ethical implications for clinical practice and future
research. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32(1), 166-178.
Harris, M., Henry, L., Harrigan, S., Purcell, R., Schwartz, O., Farrelly, S., et al. (2005).
The relationship between duration of untreated psychosis and outcome: An eightyear prospective study. Schizophrenia Research, 79(1), 85-93.
Harvey, I. (1987). Schizophrenia and metaphysics: Analyzing the DSM-III. In D.M.
Levin (Ed.), Pathologies of the modern self (pp. 305-328). New York: New York
University Press.
Hawkins, K. A., Keefe, R. S. E., Christensen, B. K., Addington, J., Woods, S. W.,
Callahan, J., et al. (2008). Neuropsychological course in the prodrome and first
episode of psychosis: Findings from the PRIME North America double blind
treatment study. Schizophrenia Research, 105(1), 1-9.
Horan, W. P., Kern, R. S., Shokat-Fadai, K., Sergi, M. J., Wynn, J. K., & Green, M. F.
(2009). Social cognitive skills training in schizophrenia: An initial efficacy study of
stabilized outpatients. Schizophrenia Research, 107(1), 47-54.
130

Johnstone, E. C., Ebmeier, K. P., Miller, P., Lawrie, S. M., & Owens, D. G. C. (2005).
Predicting schizophrenia: Findings from the Edinburgh high-risk study. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 186(1), 18-25.
Kablinger, A. S., & Freeman, A. M. I. (2000). Prodromal schizophrenia and atypical
antipsychotic treatment. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 188(10), 642-652.
Kane, J. M., Krystal, J., & Correll, C. U. (2003). Treatment models and designs for
intervention research during the psychotic prodrome. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(4),
747-756.
Keefe, R. S. E., Perkins, D. O., Gu, H., Zipursky, R. B., Christensen, B. K., &
Lieberman, J. A. (2006). A longitudinal study of neurocognitive function in
individuals at-risk for psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 88(1-3), 26-35.
Kovel, J. (1987). Schizophrenic being and technocratic society. In D.M. Levin (Ed.),
Pathologies of the modern self (pp. 330-349). New York: New York University
Press.
Kruszewski, S. P., & Paczynski, R. P. (2008). Atypical antipsychotic agents for the
schizophrenia prodrome: Not a clear first choice. International Journal of Risk &
Safety in Medicine, 20(1), 37-44.
Landa, Y., Silverstein, S., Schwartz, F., & Savitz, A. (2006). Group cognitive behavioral
therapy for delusions: Helping patients improve reality testing. Journal of
Contemporary Psychotherapy, 36(1), 9-17.

131

Lavretsky, H. (2008). History of schizophrenia as a psychiatric disorder. In K.T.
Mueser & D.V. Jeste (Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 3-13)
New York: The Guilford Press.
Lysaker, P., Glynn, S., Wilkniss, S., & Silverstein, S. (2010). Psychotherapy and
recovery from schizophrenia: A review of potential applications and need for
future study. Psychological Services, 7(2), 75-91.

Lysaker, P., & Lysaker, J. (2002). Narrative structure in psychosis: Schizophrenia and
disruptions in the dialogical self. Theory & Psychology, 12(2), 207-220.
Lysacker, P. & Lysacker, J. 2008. Schizophrenia and the fate of the self. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Malla, A. K., Norman, R. M. G., Manchanda, R., Ahmed, M. R., Scholten, D.,
Harricharan, R., et al. (2002). One year outcome in first episode psychosis: Influence
of DUP and other predictors. Schizophrenia Research, 54(3), 231.
McGlashan, T. (1996). Early detection and intervention in schizophrenia: Editor’s
introduction. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 22(2), 197-222. Retrieved from PsycINFO
Database, January 22, 2010.
McGlashan, T. H., Addington, J., Cannon, T., McGorry, P., Penn, D., Salokangas, R. K.
R., et al. (2007). Recruitment and treatment practices for help-seeking prodromal
patients. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 33(3), 715-726.
McGlashan, T.H.& Johannessen, J.O. (1996). Early detection and intervention with
schizophrenia: Rationale. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 22(2), 201-222.

132

Miller, T. J., McGlashan, T. H., Rosen, J. L., Ventura, J., Perkins, D. O., Woods, S. W.,
et al. (2003). Prodromal assessment with the structured interview for prodromal
syndromes and the scale of prodromal symptoms: Predictive validity, interrater
reliability, and training to reliability. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(4), 703-715.
Miller, T. J., McGlashan, T. H., Rosen, J. L., Somjee, L., Markovich, P. J., Stein, K., et
al. (2002). Prospective diagnosis of the initial prodrome for schizophrenia based on
the structured interview for prodromal syndromes: Preliminary evidence of interrater
reliability and predictive validity. American Journal of Psychiatry, 159(5), 863-865.
Monte, R. C., Goulding, S. M., & Compton, M. T. (2008). Premorbid functioning of
patients with first-episode nonaffective psychosis: A comparison of deterioration in
academic and social performance, and clinical correlates of premorbid adjustment
scale scores. Schizophrenia Research, 104(1), 206-213.
Morrison, A.P. (2008). Cognitive-behavioral therapy. In K.T. Mueser & D.V. Jeste
(Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 226-239). New York: The Guilford
Press.
Morrison, A.P., French, P., Walford, L., Lewis, S.W., Kilcommons, A., Green, J., Parker,
S. & Bentall, R.P. (2004). Cognitive therapy for the prevention of psychosis in
people at ultra-high risk. Journal of British Psychiatry, 185, 291-297. Retrieved
February 15, 2010 from PsychInfo online database.

Nelson, B. & Yung, A. (2008). Treatment of the schizophrenia prodrome. In K.T.
Mueser & D.V. Jeste (Eds.), Clinical handbook of schizophrenia (pp. 380-

133

389). New York: The Guilford Press.

Nelson, B., Yung, A., Bechdolf, A., & McGorry, P. (2008). The phenomenological
critique and self-disturbance: Implications for ultra-high risk ('prodrome')
research. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(2), 381-392.
Nelson, B., Simmons, M. B., Yung, A. R., O'Dwyer, L., Leicester, S., McGorry, P. D., et
al. (2008). Identifying the ultra-high risk (prodromal) population: Evaluation of
training workshops with mental health services. Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Psychiatry, 42(3), 236-243.
Niendam, T. A., Bearden, C. E., Johnson, J. K., Loewy, R., Nuechterlein, K. H., Cannon,
T. D., et al. (2006). Neurocognitive performance and functional disability in the
psychosis prodrome. Schizophrenia Research, 84(1), 100-111.
Niendam, T.A., Jalbrzikowski, M. & Bearden, C. E. (2009). Exploring predictors of
outcome in the psychosis prodrome: Implications for early identification and
intervention. Neuropscyhology Review, 19, 280-293. Retrieved January 19, 2010
from PsychInfo online database.
Olsen, K. A., & Rosenbaum, B. (2006). Prospective investigations of the prodromal state
of schizophrenia: Assessment instruments. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 113(4),
273-282.
Parnas J, Handest P, Jansson L, Saebye D. (2005). Anomalous subjective experience
among first-admitted schizophrenia spectrum patients: Empirical investigation.
Psychopathology, 38, 259–267.

134

Parnas J. & Handest, P. (2003). Phenomenology of anomalous self- experience in early
schizophrenia. Compr Psychiatry, 44, 121–134.
Sass, L. (1999). Schizophrenia, self-consciousness, and the modern mind (electronic
resource). Models of the self (pp. 319-341). Charlottesville, VA: Imprint
Academic. Retrieved April 3, 2010 from PsycINFO database.
Seikkula, J. (2003). Open dialogue integrates individual and systemic approaches in
serious psychiatric crises. Smith College Studies in Social Work, 73(2), 227-245.
Seikkula, J., Arnkil, T.E., & Eriksson, E. (2003). Postmodern society and social
networks: Anticipation dialogues in network meetings. Family Process, 42 (2),185203. Retrieved March 2, 2010 from EBSCO.
Seikkula, J. & Olsen, M. (2003). The Open Dialogue approach to acute psychosis: Its
poetics and micropolitics. Family Process, 42(3), 403-418. Retrieved February 28,
2010 from EBSCO.
Seikkula, J., & Trimble, D. (2005). Healing elements of therapeutic conversation:
dialogue as an embodiment of love. Family Process, 44(4), 461-475. Retrieved
March 7, 2010 from EBSCO.
Serruya, G. & Grant, P. (2009). Cognitive-behavioral therapy with delusions: mental
imagery within a goal-directed framework. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 68 (8),
791-802. Retrived January 26, 2010 from www.interscience.wiley.com
Shean, G. D. (2004). Understanding and treating schizophrenia: Contemporary
research, theory and practice. New York: Haworth Clinical Practice Press.
135

Simon, A. E., Cattapan-Ludewig, K., Zmilacher, S., Gruber, K., Roth, B., Zimmer, A., et
al. (2007). Cognitive functioning in the schizophrenia prodrome. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 33(3), 761-771.
Simon, A. E., Dvorsky, D. N., Boesch, J., Roth, B., Isler, E., Schueler, P., et al. (2006).
Defining subjects at risk for psychosis: A comparison of two approaches.
Schizophrenia Research, 81(1), 83-90.
Taragano, F. E., Allegri, R. F., Krupitzki, H., Sarasola, D. R., Serrano, C. M., Loñ, L., et
al. (2009). Mild behavioral impairment and risk of dementia: A prospective cohort
study of 358 patients. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 70(4), 584-592.
Tarrier, N., Lewis, S., Haddock, G., Bentall, R., Drake, R., Kinderman, P., et al. (2004).
Cognitive-behavioural therapy in first-episode and early schizophrenia: 18-month
follow-up of a randomised controlled trial. British Journal of Psychiatry,184(3),
231-239. Retrieved June 8, 2010 from PsychInfo online database.
Torrey, E. Fuller. 1995. Surviving schizophrenia: A manual for families, consumers and
providers (3rd ed). New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Tully, E. M., & McGlashan, T. H. (2006). The prodrome. In J. A. Lieberman, T. S.
Stroup, D. O. Perkins, J. A. Lieberman, T. S. Stroup & D. O. Perkins (Eds.), The
American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Schizophrenia (pp. 341-352).
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.
Velthorst, E., Nieman, D. H., Becker, H. E., van, d. F., Dingemans, P. M., Klaassen, R.,
et al. (2009). Baseline differences in clinical symptomatology between ultra high
136

risk subjects with and without a transition to psychosis. Schizophrenia Research,
109(1-3), 60-65.
Westermeyer, J. (1987). Cultural factors in clinical assessment. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 55(4), 471-478.
Whaley, A. L., & Hall, B. N. (2009). Cultural themes in the psychotic symptoms of
African American psychiatric patients. Professional Psychology: Research and
Practice, 40(1), 75-80.
White, T., Anjum, A., & Schulz, S. C. (2006). The schizophrenia prodrome. American
Journal of Psychiatry, 163(3), 376-380.
Woods, S. W., Brier, A., Zipursky, R. B., Addington, J., Hawkins, K. A., Lindborg, S. R.,
et al. (2003). Randomized trial of olanzapine versus placebo in the symptomatic
acute treatment of the schizophrenic prodrome. Biological Psychiatry, 54(4), 453464.
Yung, A., & McGorry, P. (1996). The prodromal phase of first-episode psychosis: Past
and current conceptualizations. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 22(2), 353-370. Retrieved
July 15, 2009 from PsycINFO database.
Yung, A. R., Nelson, B., Stanford, C., Cosgrave, E. M., Phillips, L. J., Buckby, J., et al.
(2008). Validation of 'prodromal' criteria to detect individuals at ultra high risk of
psychosis: 2 year follow-up. Schizophrenia Research, 105(1), 10-17.

137

Yung, A. R., Phillips, L. J., Yuen, H. P., Francey, S. M., McFarlane, C. A., Hallgren, M.,
et al. (2003). Psychosis prediction: 12-month follow up of a high-risk ('prodromal')
group. Schizophrenia Research, 60(1), 21-32.
Yung, A. R., Phillips, L. J., Yuen, H. P., Francey, S. M., McFarlane, C. A., Hallgren, M.,
et al. (2003). Psychosis prediction: 12-month follow up of a high-risk ('prodromal')
group. Schizophrenia Research, 60(1), 21-32.
Yung, A. R., Yuen, H. P., McGorry, P. D., Kelly, D., Francey, S. M., Killackey, E., et al.
(2005). Mapping the onset of psychosis: The comprehensive assessment of at-risk
mental states. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 39(11), 964-971.

138

